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THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS' PRIVILEGE
AGAINST COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION
Byron L. Warnkent tt
Although the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination applies to all citizens, law enforcement officers
traditionally have had to either waive the privilege when subjected to questioning or face punitive personnel action. Courts
consistently held that a law enforcement officer's right to retain
office depended on a willingness to forego constitutional
protections.
The Supreme Court decided several cases beginning in the
late 1960's that extended the full fifth amendment privilege to
law enforcement officers, but lower courts have misconstrued
these cases and have continued to deny fifth amendment protections. In 1974, Maryland became the first offour states to enact
a law enforcement officers' bill of rights. Although the Maryland
statute is more comprehensive than those in California, Florida,
and Virginia, it has received narrow judicial interpretation.
This article first reviews the history of the law enforcement
officer's fifth amendment and statutory protections. The article
then proposes a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights.
This bill insures not only fifth amendment protection, but provides officers with a full complement of substantive and procedural protections.
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INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment privilege against government compelled selfincrimination is most often examined in situations in which a law enforcement officer is the government "compellor" and a private citizen is
the accused person from whom an incriminating statement is sought.
This article examines the situation in which the accused, as well as the
accuser, is a law enforcement officer, and it focuses on the accused officer's privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
The law enforcement officer is intimately familiar with both the substantive and procedural law pertaining to investigatory interrogation.
For this reason, it may first appear that the officer needs less, or certainly
no more, protection from abuse than a private citizen. The same status
that endows the officer with intimate knowledge of the law, however, also
creates a problem that the accused private citizen does not face. When
the law enforcement officer is the accused, the accuser is usually the police department itself. As the officer's employer, the accuser has an additional weapon in the interrogation arsenal: the threat of adverse
personnel action if the accused officer does not cooperate fully.
A law enforcement agency may "charge" a law enforcement officer
through a noncriminal administrative process. The administrative regulations of virtually every law enforcement agency prohibit "conduct un-
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becoming an officer," 1 "insubordination," 2 and "neglect of duty." 3
Conduct unbecoming an officer is generally defined as "any conduct
which adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the bureau to which he
is assigned." 4 As courts have recognized, "[t]he standard 'conduct unbecoming a police officer' is an elastic term subject to a wide variety of
differing interpretations depending on the individual conception of how
policemen should conduct themselves." 5 Conduct unbecoming an of1. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "unbecom-

2.

3.

4.

5.

ing conduct" as follows:
Every employee shall conduct himself at all times, both on and off
duty, in a manner which reflects most favorably on the Agency. The
phrase "reflects most favorably" pertains to the perceptions of both citizens and other Agency employees. Conduct unbecoming an employee
shall include that which tends to bring the Agency into disrepute, or reflects discredit upon the employee as a representative of the Agency, or
that which tends to impair the operation or efficiency of the Agency or
employee.
MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5, § I-3-l (2d. ed. 1977 & Supp. 1984).
For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "insubordination" as follows:
An employee shall promptly obey all lawful orders of a superior, including those from a superior relayed by an employee of equal or lesser
rank. A lawful order is any order, either verbal or written, which an employee should reasonably believe to be in keeping with the performance of
the duties or the responsibilities of his post.
!d.§ I-4-2.
For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual defines "neglect of
duty" as follows: "The failure of a police employee to take appropriate action,
either on or off duty, on the occasion of a crime, disorder, or other condition deserving police or Agency administrative attention is considered neglect of duty." !d.
§ I-28-3.
Jacocks v. Montgomery County, 58 Md. App. 95, 112, 472 A.2d 485, 493 (1984)
(quoting Shannon v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 4 Pa. Cornrow. 492, 496, 287 A.2d 858,
861 (1972)); see In re Zeber, 398 Pa. 35, 43, 156 A.2d 821, 825 (1959); Upper Moreland v. Mallon, 9 Pa. Commw. 618, 627 n.5, 309 A.2d 273, 279 n.5 (1973), aff'd,
461 Pa. 241, 336 A.2d 266 (1975); see also Becker v. Merrill, 155 Fla. 379, 382, 20
So. 2d 912, 914 (1944) ("behavior ... not calculated to instill respect for him in his
subordinates or to win for himself or his force the confidence of the general public
. . . is indecorous and unbecoming to his high office").
Hruby v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 22 Ill. App. 3d 445, 453, 318 N.E.2d
132, 138 (1974); accord Gaudette v. Board of Public Safety, 20 Conn. Supp. 147,
127 A.2d 836 (1956); People ex rei. Dougan v. Greene, 97 A.D. 404, 89 N. Y.S. 1067
(1904).
In Jacocks, 58 Md. App. 95, 472 A.2d 485, the law enforcement officer went on
a tirade directed toward a superior officer. The court held that the use of insulting
and offensive language and the allegation of incompetence, in the presence of a third
police officer, would probably have an adverse effect on morale, efficiency, and discipline and thus was conduct unbecoming an officer. In Shannon, 4 Pa. Cornrow. 492,
287 A.2d 858, on the other hand, the court found similar conduct not to constitute
conduct unbecoming an officer. In that case, the officer said, "I will be a son of a
bitch.... [Y]ou will regret and remember this day." !d. at 495, 287 A.2d at 860.
The holding was supported by the fact that (1) the statement was directed toward
the police chief in the absence of civilian witnesses, (2) the profane portion of the
statement was actually directed toward the officer himself, (3) the police chief was
not intimidated by the remark, and (4) the statement was in response to the chief's
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fleer, insubordination, and neglect of duty may include such activities as
disobeying the order of a superior officer6 and withholding information
related to an investigation. 7 A determination that an officer has committed one of these offenses can result in a variety of adverse personnel actions: reprimand, reassignment, loss of leave, suspension, reduction in
rank, or even dismissal from the law enforcement agency. Imposition of
the most severe sanction, that of dismissal, usually requires "cause," a
concept that one court has defined as "some substantial shortcoming
which renders the employee's continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law
and sound public opinion recognizes as good cause for his no longer
holding the position." 8
Investigations of law enforcement officers are rarely purely criminal
in nature. Most investigations deal with situations that are hybrid administrative-criminal or are purely administrative. A common example
of the hybrid situation is a complaint by an arrestee that the officer used
excessive force. The allegation, if substantiated, constitutes both a violation of an administrative regulation9 and a criminal battery . 10 The

6.
7.
8.

9.

10.

instructions to the officer to report for duty timely, notwithstanding emergency
medical needs of his son.
Because "unbecoming conduct" is such an elastic term, it has been the subject
of void-for-vagueness attacks. E.g., Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755,
762-72, 710 P.2d 845, 849-56, 221 Cal. Rptr. 779, 782-89 (1985). Most "unbecoming conduct" cases do not implicate first amendment protections. As such, constitutionality is evaluated as applied under the facts of the case. United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). An officer cannot complain that the regulation
is void-for-vagueness if the conduct is such that the officer must have known that it
could lead to discipline or dismissal. Cranston, 40 Cal. 3d at 770, 710 P.2d at 854,
221 Cal. Rptr. at 787-88; accord Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612, 619-20 (W.O.
Va. 1982).
See Upper Moreland, 9 Pa. Commw. at 627, 309 A.2d at 279; Gaudette, 20 Conn.
Supp. 147, 127 A.2d 836.
Id.; Coursey v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339
(1967).
Davenport v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 2 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 278 N.E.2d
212, 215 (1972) (quoting Coursey, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339). The court
also stated that " 'cause' is to be decided and applied in the discretion of the Board
and a court should not reverse unless the Board's findings are so unrelated to requirements of the service or are so trivial as to be unreasonable or arbitrary." /d.
(quoting Davis v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 37 Ill. App. 2d 158, 185 N.E.2d
281 (1962)); see Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 8, 156 A. 245, 247-48
(1931) ("What constitutes cause for removal must necessarily be a matter of discretion in the commission.").
For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual's instruction with
regard to the use of force is as follows: "A police employee, acting in his official
capacity, will not use unnecessary or excessive force." Mo. STATE POLICE ADMIN.
MANUAL ch. 5, § 1-33-0.
Battery is the unjustified, offensive, and nonconsensual application of force by direct
or indirect physical conduct to the person of another. See generally R. PERKINS &
R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 151-58 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter PERKINS); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 685-91 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ScoTT]. Use of excessive force to effectuate an arrest is a criminal bat-
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purely administrative situations include violations and infractions of a
myriad of departmental regulations. 11 However, even if an investigation
commences as a purely administrative matter, a violation of virtually any
departmental rule or regulation could lead to criminal charges under the
common law misdemeanor of misconduct in office. 12 This offense includes malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance by a public officer
while in the exercise of official duties or while acting under color oflaw, 13
provided the conduct is a wilful abuse of authority and not merely an
error in judgment.t 4
When an officer is suspected of some wrongdoing, the officer is notified that a superior officer or a member of an internal investigating unit

11.

12.
13.

14.

tery and may be resisted by self-defense. See.People v. Soto, 276 Cal. App. 2d 81, 80
Cal. Rptr. 627 (1969); Boyes v. Evans, 14 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479, 58 P.2d 922, 925
(1936); Jones v. United States, 512 A.2d 253, 259 n.8 (D.C. App. 1986); State v.
Holley, 480 So. 2d 94, 95-96 (Fla. 1985); State v. Franz, 9 Kan. App. 2d 319, 676
P.2d 157 (1984); State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652, 655 (Me. 1978); State v. Nunes, 546
S.W.2d 759, 761 (Mo. App. 1977); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.04(2)(a)(ii)(3) (1962);
see also Rodgers v. State, 280 Md. 406, 373 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928
(1977); Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Right to Forcefully Resist Illegal
Arrest, 44 A.L.R.3d 1078, 1091-94 (1972).
These violations and infractions include unbecoming conduct, see supra note I; insubordination, see supra note 2; neglect of duty, see supra note 3; criticizing the
agency, MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5, § 1-5-0; immoral conduct, id.
§ 1-8-0; incompetence. /d. § 1-36-0.
Misconduct in office is also known as official misconduct, misbehavior in office, malconduct in office, malpractice in office, misdemeanor in office, and corruption in·
office. Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 387 n.l, 384 A.2d 456, •458 n.l (1978).
See generally PERKINS, supra note 10, at 540-50; e.g., Chester v. State, 32 Md. App.
593, 601-10, 363 A.2d 605, 610-13, cert. denied, 278 Md. 718 (1976); State v. Carter,
200 Md. 255, 89 A.2d 586 (1952). "The corrupt behavior may be (1) the doing of an
act which is wrongful in itself- malfeasance, or, (2) the doing of an act otherwise
lawful in a wrongful manner -misfeasance; or, (3) the omitting to do an act which is
required by the duties of the office- non-feasance." Duncan, 282 Md. at 387, 384
A.2d at 458. "The word 'corruption,' as an element of misconduct in office, is used
in the sense of depravity, perversion or taint." PERKINS, supra note 10, at 542.
Although it is true that not every set of facts sufficient to constitute conduct
unbecoming an officer or neglect of duty is sufficient for misconduct in office, the
crime is broad, particularly in its nonfeasance mode.
Any intentional and deliberate refusal by an officer to do what is unconditionally required of him by the obligations of his office is corrupt as the
word is used in this connection because he is not permitted to set up his
own judgment in opposition to the positive requirement of the law. Since
this is corrupt behavior by an officer in the exercise of the duties of his
office there is no reason to require more for conviction. On the other
hand, when the officer has discretion in regard to a certain matter, his
intentional and deliberate refusal to act indicates no more, on its face, than
that this represents his judgment as to what will best serve the public interest. Even in such a case the officer will be guilty of misconduct in office if
his forbearance results from corruption rather than from the exercise of
official discretion . . . .
/d. at 546 (emphasis in original).
See H. GINSBERG & I. GINSBERG, MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
152 (1940) (hereinafter GINSBERG).
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wishes to make some inquiries. 15 The investigating officer either expressly states 16 or implies, or custom dictates, that the officer must cooperate during questioning or face possible adverse personnel action. 17 The
penalty or threatened penalty for failure to cooperate is typically greater
in situations in which the department believes that the information is
vital to an investigation and believes that the officer is the only or best
source of the information.
The United States Supreme Court has held that citizens have the
right to refuse "to answer official questions put to him in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, when the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." 18 Although law enforcement officers presumably are entitled to that same right, they are
often required to give statements under threat of adverse personnel action or have been discharged for the failure to give statements. 19 This
dilemma has never received more than sporadic, short-lived, and incomplete attention.
When law enforcement officers early in this century began to litigate
to secure the guarantees of the fifth amendment, courts took the position
that the privilege of being a public servant is dependent upon a willingness to forego constitutional rights and privileges. 20 It was not until the
late 1960's that the United States Supreme Court undertook to rectify the
situation. In 1967, in Garrity v. New Jersey, 21 and in 1968, in Gardner v.
Broderick, 22 the Court set out to eliminate the law enforcement officer's
dilemma of having to choose between maintaining employment and exercising the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Together, Garrity and Gardner stand for the following propositions:
(1) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, any state15. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728{b) (1987).
16. For example, the Maryland State Police Administrative Manual's instruction with
regard to interrogations is as follows: "During any administrative investigation an
accused employee shall, at the request of competent authority, submit to an interrogation and polygraph examination." MD. STATE POLICE ADMIN. MANUAL ch. 5,
§ 1-16-1.
17. For example, the Maryland Annotated Code provides:
This subtitle does not prevent a law enforcement agency from commencing any action which may lead to a punitive measure as a result of a law
enforcement officer's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, blood,
breath, or urine tests for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, after having been ordered to do so by the law
enforcement agency.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii).
18. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 444-45 (1972) (includes administrative and investigatory proceedings); In re
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 683, 516 A.2d 976, 981 (1986).
19. Failure to give a statement is usually charged as insubordination or failure to obey a
lawful order. See supra note 2.
20. E.g., Christal v. Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567-68, 92 P.2d 416, 419
(1939); see infra part II.B.
21. 385 u.s. 493 (1967).
22. 392 u.s. 273 (1968).
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ment given under threat of adverse personnel action is unconstitutionally
coerced; 23 (2) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity,
the taking or threatening to take any adverse personnel action in re·
sponse to the assertion of the privilege against compelled self·incrimina·
tion has an unconstitutional, chilling effect upon the privilege; 24 (3) if a
law enforcement officer is granted immunity but nonetheless refuses to
answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official
duties, the officer may be dismissed; 25 and (4) if a law enforcement officer
is granted immunity and answers questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the officer may be dismissed if the answers
provide cause for dismissal.2 6 Consistently, however, courts have misun·
derstood, misapplied, or simply evaded Garrity, Gardner, and their
progeny. 27
Since 1970, and with greatest frequency between 1973 and 1977,
there have been many unsuccessful attempts in Congress to enact a law
enforcement officers•· biil of rights. These legislative efforts have been
designed to accomplish what Garrity and Gardner sought to accomplish. 28 Although federal legislation has never been enacted, congressional efforts have served as an impetus for state statutes providing law
enforcement officers' bills ofrights. 29 Maryland in 1974 enacted the Law
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBOR). 30 By 1978, California,
Florida, and Virginia had also enacted statutory protection.
Maryland's statute is by far the most comprehensive, but Maryland
courts have interpreted the Maryland statute narrowly. 31 The Florida
and Virginia laws, which are the two weakest statutes, have similarly
been narrowly interpreted by their respective state courts. The California statute, stronger than the Florida or Virginia statutes but weaker
than the Maryland statute, has received the broadest judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court of California, in the course of interpreting its
state statute, has understood and correctly applied Garrity and Gardner
and their progeny.
This article first analyzes the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination as it applies to law enforcement officers. 32 It
then examines legislative efforts to secure these and other rights for law
enforcement officers, including the unsuccessful federal attempt33 and the
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-500.
Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79.
/d. at 278.
/d.
See infra part III.B.
See infra part IV.A.
See infra parts IV.B., C.
Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 722, 1974 MD. LAWS 2471-77 (codified as amended at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-7340 (1987)).
31. See infra part IV.B.
32. See infra parts II., III.
33. See infra part IV.A.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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somewhat successful attempts in four states just mentioned. 34 Finally,
the article proposes a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. 35
II.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO
INCORPORATION AGAINST THE STATES

A.

The Status of the Privilege

The notion that an individual should not be compelled to incriminate himself evolved as a common law doctrine in England36 and thus
became part of the common law in this country before 1776. 37 After the
United States gained independence, states adopted this concept as part of
their state constitutions. 38 And when, in 1791, the first ten amendments
34. See infra parts IV.B., C.
35. See infra Appendix.
36. See generally E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 114(a) (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCORMICK]; 1 W. LAFA~E & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 6.2(a)
(1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ISRAEL); 0. STEPHENS, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 18-23 (1973); Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935); Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949); Sherman, Informal Immunity: Don't You Let That
Deal Go Down, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1987) [hereinafter Sherman]. In Bram
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court stated:
There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the doctrine that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify against
himself had reached its full development in the common law, was there
considered as resting on the law of nature, and was imbeddled in that
system as one of its great and distinguishing attributes.
/d. at 545.
37. See Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150-51, 406 A.2d 415, 418 (1979); Watts v. State,
99 Md. 30, 35-36, 57 A. 542, 544 (1904); Biscoe v. State, 67 Md. 6, 7, 8 A. 571, 571
(1887); Young v. State, 68 Md. App. 121, 127-32, 510 A.2d 599, 602-05, cert. denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).
By state constitution, Maryland adopted all of the common law of England as
it existed on July 4, 1776, subject to change by the Maryland General Assembly.
MD. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS art. 5. The other twelve original states did likewise,
either by constitutional provision or a "reception statute." As other states joined
the union, they either expressly adopted the common law or were at least heavily
influenced by it. LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 10, at 66; see generally Pope, The
English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REv. 6 (1910).
38. Forty-eight states have adopted the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
by constitution, and Iowa and New Jersey have accomplished the same result
through legislation. Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARV. L. REV. 21, 30
(1965). The Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides "[t]hat no
man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case."
MD. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS art. 22. This provision of the Maryland Constitution
has been held to be in pari materia with its federal counterpart. Richardson v. State,
285 Md. 261, 401 A.2d 1021 (1979). The language in a few state constitutions may
provide a guarantee that is slightly broader in scope than the federal constitution.
See McCORMICK, supra note 36, at 115. Moreover, in the last decade, a few state
courts of last resort have interpreted their state constitutional provision to provide
greater protection. E.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113-15, 545 P.2d 272,
280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976); State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657
(1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975); see Wilkes,
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to the Bill of Rights were added to the United States Constitution, the
fifth amendment included the prohibition that "[n]o person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 39
The Supreme Court in 1897 recognized in Bram v. United States4fJ
that the fifth amendment standard should be the same as the common
law standard. 41 A year earlier, the Court had stated that "the true test of
admissibility [under the common law was whether] the confession is
made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort."42
The existence of the common law privilege, state constitutional provisions, and the fifth amendment suggest that there must have been considerable protection against compelled self-incrimination. In fact, the
scope of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was quite narrow before 1964 and rarely, if ever, afforded protection to law enforcement officers. First, the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination was not a limitation upon state governments until it
was incorporated against the states in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan. 43 Sec-

39.

The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 KY. L.J. 729, 735-41
(1976). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Comment, Expanding Criminal Procedural
Rights Under State Constitutions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court stated
that the privilege:
has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the inequities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of
their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule
of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.
Id.
597.
·
168 u.s. 532 (1897).
The Court in Bram stated:
A brief consideration of the reasons which gave rise to the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment, of the wrongs which it was intended to prevent and of
the safeguards which it was its purpose unalterably to secure, will make it
clear that the generic language of the Amendment was but a crystallization of the doctrine as to confessions, well settled when the Amendment
was adopted . . . .
/d. at 543.
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574, 583-87 (1884)). In Bram v. United States, the Court stated:
As the facts by which compulsion might manifest itself, whether physical
or moral, would be necessarily ever different, the measure by which the
involuntary nature of the confession was to be ascertained was stated in
the rule, not by the changing causes, but by their resultant effect upon the
mind, that is, hope or fear, so that, however diverse might be the facts, the
test for whether the confession was voluntary would be uniform, that is,
would be ascertained by the condition of mind which the causes ordinarily
operated to create.
168 U.S. at 548.
378 U.S. 1 (1964). In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908), the Supreme
Court rejected incorporating against the states the fifth amendment privilege against

at

40.
41.

42.

43.
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ond, courts rarely invoked the common law as a source for the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination after the Bill of Rights was ratified.44 Third, state courts of last resort have only recently, and then to a
limited degree, relied on state constitutional provisions to protect individualliberties.45
Even though the fifth amendment did not apply to the states, the
Supreme Court in 1936 began to address the most egregious state cases of
compelled self-incrimination. In Brown v. Mississippi, 46 the Court found
a violation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause when a state
official obtained a confession by brutality and violence. 47 Over the next
three decades, the Court resolved numerous cases under the due process
compelled self-incrimination, holding that such a protection was neither "a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government [nor] the inalienable right of a citizen of such a government .... " Citing
Twining, the Court later stated that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination may
be withdrawn and the accused put upon the stand as a witness for the state." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). For over 55 years, the Court consistently reaffirmed the nonincorporation of the privilege against compelled selfincrimination. E.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1961); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 53-58, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-24 (1937).
44. Courts purport to adhere to the principle of deciding cases on nonconstitutional
grounds if possible. Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 150 n.1, 406 A.2d 415,418 n.1
(1979) (quoting State v. Raithal, 285 Md. 478, 484, 404 A.2d 264, 267 (1979)).
Instead, courts usually either (1) use the constitutional analysis for constitutional
protections that had their roots in the common law, or (2) deem the constitutional
and nonconstitutional analysis to be identical. In Hillard, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland "rediscovered" the common law basis for the prohibition against compelled self-incrimination after years of dormancy. Just two years earlier, in State v.
Kidd, 281 Md. 32, 375 A.2d 1105 (1977), the court stated that voluntariness of a
statement "is bottomed upon constitutional grounds [and] ... The imposition upon
the state of the federal constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimination effected no change in the voluntariness requirement followed by Maryland for
the admissibility of confessions and admissions." /d. at 34-35, 375 A.2d at 1107-08;
see also Young v. State, 68 Md. App. 121, 127-32, 510 A.2d 599, 602-05, cerL denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).
45. See supra note 38. As recently as 1974, one commentator considered it an astonishing development that courts were "willing to protect rights of criminal defendants
that are no longer guaranteed under the Federal Constitution." Wilkes, The New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY.
L.J. 421, 425 (1974). In 1977, Justice Brennan wrote:
I suggest to the bar that, although in the past it might have been safe for
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it
would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional
. questions.
[T]he very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies constitutes
a clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With the federal locus
of our double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the
states betray the trust the Court has put in them.
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502-03 (1977).
46. 297 u.s. 278 (1936).
47. /d. at 285-86.
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clause, using a voluntariness test, applied on a case-by-case basis. 48 Voluntariness encompasses a totality of the circumstances analysis, which
usually depends on either the conduct of the interrogating police officers,
or the characteristics ofthe accused, or both. 49 Unacceptable police conduct ranges from trickery and subtle coercion50 to threats of physical
harm 51 to actual physical brutality and torture. 52 Evaluation of police
conduct also includes the length of time the accused is subjected to questioning53 and the conditions during questioning. 54 The determinative
characteristics of the accused include age, 55 physical condition, 56 mental
condition, 57 and education. 58

B.

The Status of Law Enforcement Officers

Prior to incorporation of the fifth amendment in 1964, 59 the law
enforcement officer enjoyed virtually no protection against compelled
self-incrimination. In no reported opinion did a law enforcement officer
in a criminal case make an incriminating statement later found to be involuntary because it was made under threat of loss of job. On the contrary, many judicial decisions affirmed the administrative sanction of
dismissal for a law enforcement officer who remained silent. 60 The rna48. See generally 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, § 6.2; Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
49. C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS§ 16.02 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter WHITEBREAD).
50. E.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954). See generally White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 581 (1979); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82
HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968).
51. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
52. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
53. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (five hours of interrogation); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours of interrogation); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940) (five days of interroation).
54. E.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (deprivation of sleep); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958) (deprivation of food); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945) (deprivation of clothes); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (held
incommunicado).
55. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15-year-o1d).
56. E.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (bullet wound); Jackson v. Denno,
'
378 U.S. 368 (1964) (bullet wound).
57. E.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) ("truth serum" type of medication);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (low intelligence quotient); Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (schizophrenic).
58. E.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (fifth grade education); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (fifth grade education); cf Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S.
55 (1951) (non-English speaking).
59. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
60. E.g., McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923 (1958); Christal v.
Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939); Fallon v. New Orleans
Police Dep't, 238 La. 531, liS So. 2d 844 (1959); Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y.
166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245
(1931); see Recent Decision, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 91, 98-101 (1968) (brief history
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jority of these cases rejected an assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 61 In others, particularly the earlier cases, the
compelled self-incrimination issue was neither raised by the law enforcement officer nor addressed by the court. 62
The law enforcement officer's privilege against compelled self-incrimination was not recognized when the officer was called before a
grand jury, 63 was forced to execute a waiver of immunity from prosecution, 64 was ordered to submit to a polygraph examination, 65 or administratively questioned. 66 Regardless of the context or the forum, the result
was the same: discharge from the law enforcement agency, usually for
conduct unbecoming an officer, or for insubordination, or both, followed
by affirmance of that action by the courts. 67 These cases conveyed the
message that in order to remain employed, a law enforcement officer
must renounce constitutional freedoms available to the public at large.
The consistent theme of the early decisions was that a law enforcement
officer not only accepts employment under these terms but also that he
has a duty to dispel suspicion by full explanation.
The leading authority for more than a quarter century for the proposition that the waiving of constitutional rights is one of the duties of a
law enforcement officer was Christal v. Police Commissioner, 68 a case decided in 1939 by the Court of Appeal of California. In Christal, police
officers who refused to answer questions before a grand jury were
charged administratively with "conduct unbecoming an officer and disobedience of orders. " 69 The officers appealed their dismissals, asserting
that they had a constitutional privilege of refusing to testify before the
grand jury. The court agreed that the officers had a right to remain silent
but held that duty required them to disclose information, even to the
point of incriminating themselves, and that they could be dismissed if
they refused to answer. 70 The court stated:
When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which tend to
incriminate any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to
their superiors and to testify freely concerning such facts when
called upon to do so before any duly constituted court or grand
jury. It is for the performance of these duties that police of-

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

of forfeiture of government employment as punishment for those who "plead the
fifth").
E.g., McCain, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923; Christal, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92
P.2d 416; Fallon, 238 La. 531, 115 So. 2d 844; Canteline, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d
972.
E.g., Souder, 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245.
See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
Id. at 566, 92 P.2d at 418.
Id. at 567, 92 P.2d at 419.
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fleers are commissioned and paid by the community, and it is a
violation of said duties for any police officer to refuse to disclose
pertinent facts within his knowledge even though such disclosure may show, or tend to show, that he himself has engaged in
criminal activities.
We are not unmindful of the constitutional privilege above
mentioned which may be exercised by all persons, including police officers, in any proceeding, civil or criminal. . . . As we
view the situation, when pertinent questions were propounded
to appellants before the grand jury, the answers to which questions would tend to incriminate them, they were put to a choice
which they voluntarily made. Duty required them to answer.
Privilege permitted them to refuse to answer. They chose to
exercise the privilege, but the exercise of such privilege was
wholly inconsistent with their duty as police officers. They
claim that they had a constitutional right to refuse to answer
under the circumstances, but it is certain that they had no constitutional right to remain police officers in the face of their
clear violation of the duty imposed upon them....
There is nothing startling in the conception that a public
servant's right to retain his office or employment should depend
upon his willingness to forego his constitutional rights and privileges to the extent that the exercise of such rights and privileges may be inconsistent with the performance of the duties of
his office or employment. 71
Almost twenty years later, the same court held that even the exercise of a
71. Id. at 567-69, 92 P.2d at 419 (citations omitted). One of the omitted citations is to
McAuliff v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), in which
Justice Holmes, upholding an officer's dismissal for violating the rule prohibiting
political activity, stated that a law enforcement officer "may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." /d. at
220, 29 N.E. at 517.
Cf Wendland v. Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 786, 298 P.2d 863 (1956) (police officer
with more than 25 years service could be discharged for refusal to testify before the
grand jury but could not be denied a pension); In re Hoertkom, 15 Cal. App. 2d 93,
59 P.2d 218 (1936); In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 82, 59 P.2d 213 (1936) (companion cases indicating that although police officers could assert a privilege against
compelled self-incrimination when asked questions before the grand jury, they could
not use the privilege to prevent being sworn as a witness before the grand jury).
Christal v. Police Comm'r was relied on by Justice Harlan in dissent in Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 504 n.3 (1967), the case that extended full fifth amendment privileges to law enforcement officers. See infra text accompanying notes 97105. The year after Christal, the Court of Appeals of New York cited Christal in
upholding the state constitutional requirement that police officers called before the
grand jury either execute a waiver of immunity from prosecution or forfeit their
public employment. Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972. This is
the same constitutional provision that was found unconstitutional by the Sup Court
in Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
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constitutional guarantee can support a charge of conduct unbecoming an
officer. 72 The court affirmed a dismissal for insubordination, disobedience, and conduct unbecoming an officer because a police officer refused
to take a polygraph test concerning missing cash receipts.7 3
The following year, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in Fallon v.
New Orleans Police Department, 14 upheld the provision of the state constitution that mandated forfeiture of office for any public employee who
refused to waive immunity from prosecution or who refused, on grounds
of compelled self-incrimination, to answer any question related to government affairs or the conduct of any employee. 75 The court reasoned
that the public good outweighs one individual's constitutional rights,
particularly when holding public office is not a right but is a privilege
"conferred only upon such terms and conditions, as the people, speaking
through their chosen representatives, might determine. " 76
In Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 11 an officer was charged administratively and criminally. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania not only
denied the officer his fifth amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination, but essentially shifted the burden of proof in his criminal
case. In affirming the civil service commission's dismissal for conduct
unbecoming an officer, the court stated that "in order to show his fitness
to continue as an officer in the police department, he was bound to exculpate himself from any wrongdoing. This he did not do, but remained
silent before the commission. In itself this was conduct unbecoming an
officer. " 78
As these cases illustrate, state courts consistently upheld the right to
terminate the employment of a law enforcement officer who refused to
cooperate in departmental investigations, notwithstanding the right
against compelled self-incrimination found in the common law, state
constitutions, and the federal constitution. The courts did not engage in
any judicial wizardry in barring fifth amendment protection to law enforcement officers. They simply ruled that under state constitutional
law, and as a matter of professional standards, law enforcement officers
72. McCain v. Sheridan, 160 Cal. App. 2d 174, 324 P.2d 923 (1958); accord Fichera v.
State Personnel Bd., 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1963). In Coursey v.
Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339 (1967), the
court stated that statutes prohibiting courts from even suggesting to civil and criminal litigants that they submit to a polygraph examination do not apply before a
Board of Fire and Police Commissioners because the department must use polygraph testing to meet the statutory requirement that it investigate charges of
misconduct.
73. McCain, 160 Cal. App. 2d at 177, 324 P.2d at 926.
74. 238 La. 531, 115 So. 2d 844 (1959).
75. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15(P)(1).
76. Fallon, 238 La. at 546, 115 So. 2d at 849 (quoting Ricks v. Department of State
Civil Serv., 200 La. 341, 363, 8 So. 2d 49, 56 (1942)).
77. 305 Pa. 1, 156 A. 245 (1931).
78. /d. at 9, 156 A. at 248; see also Avent v. Police Bd., 49 Ill. App. 2d 228, 199 N.E.2d
637 (1964) (refusal to obey an order to answer questions posed by a superior officer
concerning a sobriety test constituted conduct unbecoming an officer).
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stood outside the purview of the fifth amendment. This view met with no
opposition from the Supreme Court, which held that the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination was inapplicable
to state court proceedings.
Ill.

A.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AFTER
INCORPORATION AGAINST THE STATES

The Status of the Privilege

Beginning in 1936, the Supreme Court made limited use of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to protect state court defendants, applying it to only the most extreme cases of compelled selfincrimination. 79 At the same time, the Court continued to hold that the
fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination was inapplicable to state court proceedings. 80 With the advent of the Warren
Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure, 81 however, the decade of the 1960's brought rapid and significant change.
In 1961, the Court made the exclusionary rule applicable to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio. 82 Two years later, the Court incorporated the
sixth amendment right to counsel against the states in Gideon v. Wainwright. 83 The following year, with the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination not yet incorporated, the Court employed a
right to counsel approach to exclude statements made at a critical stage
subsequent to the attachment of the right to counsel. 84 The Court then
directly and significantly expanded fifth amendment rights in a series of
cases beginning with Malloy v. Hogan 85 and ending with Miranda v.
Arizona. 86
1.

From Malloy to Miranda

In 1964, the Court made the safeguards of the fifth amendment prohibition against compelled self-incrimination applicable to the states in
Malloy v. Hogan. 87 A year later, in Griffin v. California, 88 the Court held
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

See supra text accompanying notes 46-58.
See supra note 43.
See generally 1 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 36, §§ 2.1-.9.
367 u.s. 643 (1961).
372 u.s. 335 (1963).
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See generally WHITEBREAD, supra
note 49, § 16.03. The right to counsel attaches at the initiation of judicial adversarial proceedings, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), or at a trial-like confrontation. E.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970) (preliminary hearing); Mempha
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing proceeding). A critical stage is when substantial rights of the defendant may be affected without counsel. Eg., United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup). See generally WHITEBREAD, supra note 49,
§ 31.03(b)-(c).
378 u.s. 1 (1964).
384 u.s. 436 (1966).
378 u.s. 1 (1964).
380 U.S. 609, reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957 (1965).
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that a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of the privilege is as much a
constitutional violation as actually compelling witnesses to incriminate
themselves. The Court prohibited both jury instructions and
prosecutorial comment that would permit a jury to draw a negative inference from a defendant's silence at trial. 89 Two years after Malloy, in
Miranda v. Arizona, 90 the Court made clear that the fifth amendment
would be the focal point for the analysis of compelled self-incrimination
cases.
Malloy and Miranda are landmark cases in the history of the fifth
amendment. In Malloy, the Court broke new ground by squarely holding that states must respect the fifth amendment privileges of their citizens. Justice Brennan stated for the Court: "The Fourteenth
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the
Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement - the right of
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence." 91
In Miranda, the Court found that, notwithstanding its prior holdings, police science literature and police manuals were instructing interrogators to use isolation, persuasion, trickery, and subtle coercion to
obtain confessions, and in no way discouraged the use of the "third degree. " 92 Because such practices lead to flagrant constitutional violations,
the Court mandated four specific warnings to any person subjected to
custodial interrogation. 93 Although fifth amendment analysis is typically
viewed as the dual approach ofvoluntariness and Miranda, 94 the goal of
Miranda was to realize, by the use of per se rules if necessary, the prom89. Id. at 613. The Court further stated that "comment on the refusal to testify ... is a
penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." ld. at 614.
90. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
91. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8.
92. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55. With reference to the "third degree," the Court
stated: "Offensive to the Constitutional guarantees of liberty are confessions wrung
from an accused by overpowering his will, whether through physical violence or the
more subtle forms of coercion commonly known as the 'third degree.'" Hysler v.
Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942). Webster's Dictionary defines the "third degree"
as "the subjection of a prisoner to mental torture (as continuous questioning over
excessively long periods) or physical torture (as restriction to a meager diet or deprivation of sleep) in an effort to wring a confession from him." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2378 (1976).
93. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73. The four warnings are that (1) the defendant has the
right to remain silent; (2) if the defendant waives that right, any statement given
may be introduced as evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant has the right
to an attorney present during questioning; and (4) if the defendant cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided during questioning. ld. De minimus variations are
permissible. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
94. The vitality of the Court's mandate in Miranda has been lessened by recent decisions. E.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (the "public safety exception"); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (custody requires arrest); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (narrowing the scope of interrogation). With
the weakening of Miranda, the due process and right to counsel approaches are
gaining in importance in the analysis of compelled self-incrimination cases. See

Baltimore Law Review

468

[Vol. 16

ise of the fifth amendment that no person would be compelled to incriminate himself. 95 Chief Justice Warren advised that "[u]nless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly
be the product of his free choice. " 96
2.

Garrity and Spevak

Beginning in 1967, three years after Malloy extended the prohibitions against compelled self-incrimination to state governments, the
Court decided six cases that had a significant impact on the fifth amendment rights of law enforcement officers. The first two were the companion cases of Garrity v. New Jersey 97 and Spevak v. Klein. 98 In Garrity,
police officers were interrogated about an alleged conspiracy to obstruct
the administration of traffic laws. 99 They were informed that under New
Jersey law they would be subject to removal from office if they exercised
their right to remain silent. 100 The officers answered the questions, their
answers were admitted into evidence in their subsequent criminal trials
on conspiracy charges, and they were convicted.
In resolving the issue of whether a state can use the threat of discharge to obtain incriminating statements from a public employee, the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 519-22 (1986) (due process approach); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (right to counsel approach).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
/d. at 458.
385 u.s. 493 (1967).
385 u.s. 511 (1967).
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. The officers were interrogated by the State Attorney General's Office, under order of the Supreme Court of New Jersey to investigate alleged
irregularities in the handling of municipal court cases. /d.
The New Jersey statute in effect at the time provided:
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public
office, position or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who
refuses to testify upon matters relating to the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a
witness on behalf of the prosecution, upon the ground that his answer may
tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness against himself or
refuses to waive immunity when called by a grand jury to testify thereon
or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any court, commission or
body of this state which has the right to inquire under oath upon matters
relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who, having been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question upon
the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to
be a witness against himself, shall, if holding elective or public office, position or employment, be removed therefrom or shall thereby forfeit his office, position or employment and any vested or future right of tenure or
pension granted to him by any law of this State provided the inquiry related to a matter which occurred or arose within the preceding five years.
Any person so forfeiting his office, position or employment shall not thereafter be eligible for election or appointment to any public office, position or
employment in this State.
N.J. REV. STAT.§ 2A:81-l7.1 (Supp. 1965).
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Court did not reach the constitutionality of the forfeiture statute. Instead, the Court focused on whether fear of discharge for refusal to answer, on the one hand, and fear of self-incrimination, on the other,
created a " 'choice between the rock and the whirlpool' which made the
statements products of coercion .... " 101 In a five-to-four decision, the
Court found that duress is inherent when an individual is forced to
choose between exercising the fifth amendment privilege and remaining a
law enforement officer and, therefore, the statements were involuntary as
a matter of law. Rejecting the State's argument that a law enforcement
officer has no constitutional right to employment and must accept the
position on the terms under which it is offered, the majority stated that
police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights." 102 Moreover, "[t]he option [presented to the police officers]" to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of selfincrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain
silent." 103
Writing in dissent, Justice Harlan adopted the pre-incorporation
view that a law enforcement officer forfeits constitutional rights as a condition of employment. 104 The other dissent, written by Justice White,
recommended the notion that would be adopted as dicta in four subsequent cases. He contended that the appropriate balance between the fifth
amendment privilege and· the "legitimate interest [of citizens] in ridding
themselves of faithless officers [was to exclude the compelled statement in
any criminal proceeding but allow its use] to discharge an employee who
refuses to cooperate in the State's effort to determine his qualifications for
continued employment. "10s
In Garrity's companion case, Spevak v. Klein, 106 the Court followed
the Garrity analysis, holding that a state cannot disbar an attorney because of a refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry. The Court stated that an
101. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496 (citing Stevens v. Marks, 393 U.S. 234, 243 (1966) (quoting
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926))).
102. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
103. /d. at 497. The Court also relied upon Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956), a pre-incorporation case holding that due process was violated by discharging a public school teacher solely for invoking the privilege against compelled selfincrimination before a congressional committee. The Court stated: "The privilege
against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise
could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 499-500 (quoting Slochower, 350 U.S. at 55758).
104. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500-10. Justice Harlan believed that "[t]he validity of a consequence depends both upon the hazards, if any, it presents to the integrity of the
privilege and upon the urgency of the public interests it is designed to protect."' /d.
at 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Relying on Christal v. Police Comm'r. 33 Cal. App.
2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939), he concluded that when confronted with alleged police
misconduct, the public interests outweigh the integrity of the privilege. Garrity, 385
U.S. at 509-10. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
105. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 532 (White, J., dissenting).
106. 385 U.S. at 511 (1967).
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individual cannot enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed unfettered exercise of the right to remain silent if there may be a penalty for asserting
that right. The Court observed that the instrument of threat is as powerful as actual compulsion by use of the legal process. 107
In Spevak, as in Garrity, Justice White's suggestion of an appropriate balance between constitutional rights and employment rights was not
considered by the majority. 108 However, Justice Fortas' concurrence in
Spevak did address Justice White's concern, as follows:
I would distinguish between a lawyer's right to remain silent
and that of a public employee who is asked questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his
official duties as distinguished from his beliefs on other matters
that are not within the scope of the specific duties which he
undertook faithfully to perform as part of his employment by
the State. This Court has never held, for example, that a policeman may not be discharged for refusal in disciplinary proceedings to testify as to his conduct as a police officer. It is
quite a different matter if the State seeks to use the testimony
given under this lash in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 109
The fifth amendment, incorporated against the states on behalf of all
citizens in Malloy, was expressly incorporated on behalf of law enforcement officers in 1967 in Garrity. However, at the same time, first in the
dissent in Garrity and then in the concurrence in Spevak, the groundwork
was laid for balancing the constitutional rights of law enforcement officers with the historical requirement of full accountability of the public
trust.
3.

Gardner and Sanitation Men

The year after Garrity and Spevak, the Court decided the companion cases of Gardner v. Broderick 110 and Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commission of Sanitation . 111 In Gardner, a police officer was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating police corruption
and bribery stemming from illegal gambling. He was advised that if he
did not waive his right to remain silent and did not waive immunity from
prosecution, he would be discharged under New York law. 112 Unlike
107. /d. at 516 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)).
108. In Spevak, Justice Douglas observed that "[w]hether a policeman, who invokes the
privilege when his conduct as a police officer is questioned in disciplinary proceedings, may be discharged for refusing to testify is a question we did not reach in
Garrity." Spevak, 385 U.S. at 516 n.3.
109. /d. at 519-20.
110. 392 u.s. 273 (1968).
111. 392 u.s. 280 (1968).
112. At the time, the New York City Charter provided:
If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after
lawful notice or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court
or judge, any legislative committee, or any officer, board or body author-
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Garrity, in which threat of discharge led the officer to make a statement,
in Gardner the officer refused to make a statement, which resulted in
discharge. 113 The police department argued successfully in state court
that it is constitutional to confront a law enforcement officer with a
"choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood,
[because] he is directly, immediately, and entirely responsible to the city
or State which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it." 114 Unpersuaded, a unanimous Supreme Court 115 reversed the Court of Appeals
of New York, which had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the officer's petition for reinstatement. Applying the holding of Garrity to a
"chilling effect" situation as in Griffin, Justice Fortas reasoned that an
unsuccessful attempt to coerce is as unconstitutional as a successful one.
Accordingly, dismissing an officer for asserting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is as much a fifth amendment violation as coercing the officer to make a statement by threatening dismissal. 116
Thus, the import of Gardner is that Garrity applies regardless of the
choice made by the law enforcement officer when confronted with the
dilemma of choosing between a constitutional right and continued em-

113.
114.
115.
116.

ized to conduct any hearing or inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to
testify or to answer any question regarding the property, government or
affairs of ihe city or of any county included within its territorial limits, or
regarding the nomination, election, appointment or official conduct of any
officer or employee of the city or of any such county, on the ground that
his answer would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive immunity from prosecution on account of any such matter in relation to which
he may be asked to testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or
tenure of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or employment under the city or any agency.
N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 1123. At the time, the New York Constitution provided:
No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, providing, that any public officer who, upon being called
before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his present office
... or the performance of his official duties ... refuses to sign a waiver of
immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall by
virtue of such refusal, be disqualified from holding any other public office
or public employment for a period of five years ... and shall be removed
from his present office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his
present office at the suit of the attorney-general.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
The Court framed the issue as '"whether a policeman who refuses to waive the protections which the privilege gives him may be dismissed from office because of that
refusal." Gardner, 392 U.S. at 276.
/d. at 277.
Justice Black concurred in the result. /d. at 279. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice
Stewart, wrote a concurring opinion. /d. at 285.
The Court stated in Gardner: "He was dismissed for failure to relinquish the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . [T]he mandate of the great
privilege against self-incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its
ultimate effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on penalty of
the loss of employment." /d. at 278-79 (footnote and citation omitted).
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ployment. Significantly, the Court, in dicta, unanimously heeded Justice
White's call for an appropriate balance, issued a year earlier in his Garrity dissent and advanced by Justice Fortas in concurrence in Spevak.
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in Gardner, stated that if a police
officer is provided with immunity, then failure to answer questions narrowly relating to the performance of official duties may result in a constitutionally permissible discharge from office. 117
Through the holdings of Garrity and Gardner, the Supreme Court in
an eighteen month period rewrote seventy-five years worth of law pertaining to the rights of law enforcement officers. Moreover, applying the
appropriate balance, recognized in the dicta of Gardner, a law enforcement agency could take disciplinary action against a law enforcement
officer without interfering with the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and an officer could assert the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination without interfering with the agency's disciplinary process. Thus, the fifth amendment rights of a law enforcement officer,
when appropriately balanced with the rights of a law enforcement
agency, produce the following:
(1) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, any
statement given under threat of adverse personnel action is unconstitutionally coerced (Garrity holding); 118
(2) if a law enforcement officer is not provided with immunity, the
taking or threatening to take any adverse personnel action in response to
the assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination has an
unconstitutional chilling effect upon the privilege (Gardner holding); 119
(3) if a law enforcement officer is granted immunity but nonetheless
refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to
official duties, the officer may be dismissed (Gardner dicta); 120 and
(4) if a law enforcement officer is granted immunity and answers
questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the
officer may be dismissed if the answers provide cause for dismissal (implicit in the Gardner dicta).1 21
117. The Court stated:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his
answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, the privilege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal.
The facts of the case, however, do not present this issue. Here, petitioner was summoned to testify before a grand jury in an investigation of
alleged criminal conduct. He was discharged from office not for failure to
answer relevant questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive
a constitutional right.
ld. at 278 (citation and footnote omitted).
118. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-500.
119. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79.
120. Jd. at 278.
121. Jd.
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In Gardner's companion case, Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commission of Sanitation, 122 the Court found that fifteen sanitation workers were not discharged because of a refusal to account for their
official conduct but because they asserted and refused to waive a constitutional privilege. 123 Justice Fortas, again writing for a unanimous
Court, reversed the judgment that had affirmed the dismissal of the
workers' action for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief. He
reiterated the Gardner dicta but, under the facts before the Court, found
that Garrity and Gardner were dispositive. 124
4.

Turley and Cunningham

In 1973, in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 125 the Court reaffirmed its prior
holdings and more clearly explained the dicta in Gardner and Sanitation
Men. In Turley, architects were disqualified from public contracts because they refused to waive their privilege against compelled self-incrimination and immunity from prosecution. 126 Finding Garrity, Gardner, and
Sanitation Men controlling, the Court rejected the State's argument that
its interest in disqualifying the architects from public contracts is sufficiently strong to override the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, concluding that a "waiver secured under threat of substantial
economic sanction cannot be termed voluntary." 127
More significant was the Court's amplification of the dicta in Gardner and Sanitation Men. The term immunity in Gardner must have been
intended as a constitutional term of art. The Court in Turley stated that
if a government agency needs or wants information, then the prosecutor
must provide a grant of immunity, accompanied by the power of the
courts to compel immunized testimony through civil contempt proceedings.128 Adhering to the theme of the need for an appropriate balance,
the Court stated that "[i]mmunity is required if there is to be 'rational
accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legiti122. 392 u.s. 280 (1968).
123. /d. at 283.
124. The Court stated:
[I]f New York had demanded that petitioners answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official
duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had
refused to do so, this case would be entirely different.

125.
126.
127.
128.

They were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York
was seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of their public
trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional
prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally.
/d. at 285 (footnote omitted).
414 u.s. 70 (1973).
/d. at 75-76.
/d. at 82-83.
/d. at 81-82, 84.
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mate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.' " 129 "It is in
this sense that immunity statutes have 'become part of our constitutional
fabric.' " 130 The Court noted that had adequate immunity been given,
then cancellation of and disqualification from government contracts
would have been permissible. 131
Four years later, in Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 132 the Court struck
down a New York statute that provided for the removal of an officer of a
political party, as well as disqualification from holding public office for
five years, if the officer refused to waive the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination or refused to waive immunity from criminal prosecution.133 The State of New York, having argued the losing side in Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley, attempted to distinguish Cunningham
on the ground that there was no threatened economic loss associated
with a non-paying, honorary political position. The State argued further
that its interest in the integrity of the political system justified any constitutional infringement. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, declared the statute to be in violation of the fifth amendment, rejecting any
attempt to distinguish the facts of Cunningham from Garrity, Gardner,
Sanitation Men, and Turley. 134 As for the State's asserted interest, he
wrote that the "[g]overnment has compelling interests in maintaining an
honest police force and civil service, but this Court did not permit those
interests to justify infringement of Fifth Amendment rights in Garrity,
Gardner, and Sanitation Men ... .''135
Taken together, Garrity, Spevak, Gardner, Sanitation Men, Turley,
and Cunningham signalled a new era in the evolution of the fifth amendment rights of law enforcement officers, an era in which their secondclass constitutional status was apparently eliminated. The last three
decades of the century promised to be an era in which, as Justice Douglas
said in Garrity, police officers would not receive a "watered-down version
/d. at 81 (quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972)).
/d. at 81-82 (quoting Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)).
Turley, 414 U.S. at 84-85.
431 U.S. 801 (1977). This case is sometimes referred to as Lefkowitz /1
/d.
The Court stated:
[Garrity, Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley] settle that government
cannot penalize assertion of the constitutional privilege against compelled
self-incrimination by imposing sanctions to compel testimony which has
not been immunized. It is true ... that our earlier cases were concerned
with penalties having a substantial economic impact. But the touchstone
of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic sanctions and
imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids.
[The statute] is therefore constitutionally indistinguishable from the
coercive provisions we struck down in Gardner, Sanitation Men, and
Turley .... The threatened loss of such widely sought positions, with their
power and perquisites, is inherently coercive.
/d. at 806-07.
135. /d. at 808.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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of constitutional rights." 136 With the states required to apply federal law
under Malloy, the Garrity and Gardner combination appeared to protect
law enforcement officers both ways. If an officer gave a statement under
threat of adverse personnel action, Garrity made the statement involuntary and unconstitutional as a matter of law. If, on the other hand, punitive personnel action was taken when an officer refused to give a
statement, the action was unconstitutional under Gardner. If there were
any concern that these might be short-lived Warren Court era doctrines,
that concern was addressed a decade later in Cunningham when Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for a seven-to-one Court, 137 relied on Garrity
and Gardner. He emphasized that even the compelling governmental interest in honest law enforcement is not sufficient justification for diluting
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 138

B.

The Status of Law Enforcement Officers

The promises of Garrity and Gardner were never fully realized for
law enforcement officers. Although the blatant contravention of Garrity
and Gardner was remedied, subtle violations were not. In situations in
which courts were confronted with constitutional, 139 statutory, 140 or reg136. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
137. Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist took no part in the decision. Justice Stevens'
dissent in no way undermined Ga"ity or Gardner but took the position that they did
not apply because those asserting the fifth amendment privilege in Cunningham
were policymaking government officials and not typical public employees. /d. at
810-15.
138. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 804-08.
139.
Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975), the court invalidated the so-called "Charter warnings" of section 10-110 of the Philadelphia Home
Rule Charter, which provided for forfeiture of office for assertion of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. The court held that the statement obtained
under such threat was not only inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, but
inadmissible for impeachment purposes because, under Pennsylvania law, use for
impeachment would chill the defendant's election to testify. The concurring justice
believed that the statement induced by the "Charter warnings" had to be suppressed
for impeachment purposes because of federal constitutional law. He stated that
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), constitutionally permitting the use of
statements for impeachment, applied only to statements taken in violation of Miranda but otherwise trustworthy. According to the concurrence, statements that
violate Garrity are inherently coercive, involuntary, and untrustworthy and therefore inadmissible both in the case in chief and on cross-examination. 462 Pa. at 252,
341 A.2d at 65-66.
In Sellers v. Corlberton, 224 So. 2d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), Dade
County conceded the unconstitutionality of the county code provision that required
forfeiture of office for assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
The county charter, however, still contained a forfeiture provision. In Englander v.
State, 246 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1971), the court applied Garrity and Gardner to invalidate the waiver of immunity signed by a member of the City Council of the City of
Miami Beach and to strike down the charter provision.
140. In Raphael v. Conrad, 371 F. Supp. 256, 259 (S.D. Ind. 1974), the court found
unconstitutional the state code provision that required an affidavit in order to be
eligible to be a paid lobbyist. The affidavit required a statement that the affiant is
not, and never was, a member of the communist party, and that the affiant never
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ulatory 141 provisions similar to those in Garrity and Gardner, the provisions were struck down quickly by courts or amended by legislatures.
However, once across-the-board violations were remedied, unconstitutional action~ continued that were more difficult to detect and prove.
System-wide, explicit schemes sanctioning punitive personnel action for
the assertion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination were
replaced with incident-by-incident threats, either express or implied, and
grants of immunity to a law enforcement officer were rare. 142 Law enforcement officers still face the constitutionally impermissible dilemma of
attempting to preserve a career by relinquishing the privilege, as in Garrity, or preserving the privilege at the cost of a career, as in Gardner.
Courts confronted with these situations frequently reflect the layman's
attitude toward those who "hide behind" the fifth amendment. 143 Some
courts have ruled against law enforcement officers without invoking or
misapplying Garrity and Gardner, resting on grounds such as the inapplicability of the fifth amendment because the officer did not fear a criminal
prosecution, 144 because the officer failed to assert the fifth amendment
privilege, 145 or because of the lack of either a Garrity coercion or a Gardner chill. 146 Many more courts either misunderstand, or perhaps even

141.

142.
143.

144.

145.
146.

refused to answer any question posed by any congressional committee concerning
communist party affiliation. The court held that refusal to answer these questions
on fifth amendment grounds could not be used to deny employment in a field regulated by the state.
In Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub
nom., 416 U.S. 956 (1974), the court found unconstitutional the police department
rule that prohibited both the refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination and
the refusal to waive immunity when so requested by a superior officer; see Holloway
v. State, 26 Md. App. 382, 389, 339 A.2d 319, 324, cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975)
("[w]hether the policy be statutory or by regulation the result would be the same
under Garrity, for the effect upon the officer would most surely be the same"); cf
Everitt Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 39 Colo. App. 336, 565 P.2d 967 (1977)
(unemployment compensation benefits could not be denied because of assertion of
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination before an administrative agency).
See infra part III.B.2.
Of course, there is the occasional court that extends, rather than limits, the Gardner
rule. E.g., Baxley v. North Charleston, 533 F. Supp. 1248 (D.S.C. 1982) (extending
Gardner to prohibit discharging a law enforcement officer for asserting his sixth
amendment right to counsel).
Devine v. Goodstein, 680 F.2d 243, 246-47 (1982) (finding no evidence of belief that
a written report would form the basis of a criminal prosecution); Johnston v.
Herschler, 669 F.2d 617, 619 (lOth Cir. 1982) (when discharged special agent stated
in deposition that protecting against compelled self-incrimination was not the reason for his refusal to answer).
United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 717 (lst Cir. 1980) ("defendant did not
claim the privilege").
The court in Jndorato stated:
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the rules have been
interpreted to mean that a state police officer who refuses on fifth amendment grounds to comply with an order to provide self-incriminating statements would be dismised. The language used in the rules - providing
that for violation a member may be tried and upon conviction may be
subject to dismissal or other disciplinary action - suggests that dismissal
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evade, the Garrity and Gardner holdings, the immunity requirement, or
both.
1.

Misunderstanding the Fifth Amendment Holdings of Garrity and
Gardner

A number of courts bolster their opposition to fifth amendment
rights by quoting Gardner out of context to support the erroneous position that officers must relinquish their rights in return for the privilege of
being law enforcement officers. 147 In Gardner, Justice Fortas noted that
the police department had argued that although an attorney cannot be
"confronted with Hobson's choice between self-incrimination and forfeiting his means of livelihood, the same principles should not protect a policeman."148 Before rejecting the department's argument, the Court set
forth the argument presented by the department that law enforcement
officers should be held to a different standard than attorneys, stating:
Unlike the lawyer, [the police officer] is directly, immediately,
and entirely responsible to the city or State which is his employer. He owes his entire loyalty to it. He has no other "client" or principal. He is a trustee of the public interest, bearing
the burden of great and total responsibility to his public employer. Unlike the lawyer who is directly responsible to his client, the policeman is either responsible to the State or to no
would not have automatically followed defendant's invocation of the fifth
amendment.
/d. at 716 (emphasis added).
147. Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213, 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1970) ("high obligation
owed by a policeman to his employer and his peculiar position in our society certainly must be taken into account in considering the nature and effect of disciplinary
proceedings instituted by the employer"); Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 65
(D. Md. 1970) ("a police officer holds a position of public trust, and in that respect,
his conduct must be of a higher moral character than that of the ordinary citizen");
Civil Serv. Ass'n, Local400 v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 455, 188
Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1983) ("While a public employee cannot be forced to give an
answer which may tend to incriminate him or her in criminal proceedings, he may
be required to choose between disclosing information and losing his employment.");
Sczaciarz v. California State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904, 918, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 403 (1978) ("Unless the government seeks testimony that will subject its
giver to criminal liability, the constitutional right to remain silent absent immunity
does not arise."); Gerace v. Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 350, 358, 100 Cal. Rptr.
917, 923 ( 1972) ("Fitness to serve as a policeman and criminal behavior are antithetical and antagonistic and cannot coexist."). Other courts have reached the same
result without referring to Gardner. E.g., Eshelman v. Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376,
378, 560 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1977) ("compulsory use of the polygraph during departmental investigation is consistent with the maintenance of a police or sheriff's department that is of the highest integrity and beyond suspicion"); Richardson v. City
of Pasadena, 500 S. W.2d 175, 177 (fex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd of other grounds, S 13
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1974) ("[b]y accepting public employment as a police officer he
subordinated his right of privacy as a private citizen to the superior right of the
public to an efficient and credible police department").
148. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 277.
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This distinction, rejected in Gardner as a basis for providing less constitutional protection to law enforcement officers than to attorneys, is often
erroneously quoted as the holding of Gardner. 150 Thus, many courts misconstrue Gardner, reaching a conclusion totally opposite to the intended
holding in that case.
Gardner was especially misunderstood by the United States district
court in Pinkney v. District ofColumbia. 151 The court began by misconstruing Gardner in the manner just described. This error was then compounded by the court's holding that, although a constitutional privilege
may not be totally abridged, no constitutional question is raised when a
constitutional right is merely burdened. According to the court:
[T]he government employee, unlike the ordinary citizen, is a
"trustee of the public interest" . . . . [S]ecuring from government employees an accounting of their public trust by no
means justifies the state in totally abridging the fifth amendment rights of public employees. But it does justify the imposition of some burdens on the privilege. The demarcation line
between the permissible and impermissible is plainly set out in a
line of cases beginning with Gardner.
[The public employee] could have either contested his proposed
removal by disclosing information about the pending criminal
charges and in the process exposed himself to potential self~in
crimination, or as he did, he could have chosen to remain silent
and thereby sacrificed his right to a hearing and, through that,
the chance of retaining his job. No waiver of fifth amendment
immunity was compelled. To be sure, this choice placed -plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma and burdened him in the exercise
of his fifth amendment right to remain silent. But under Gardner and its progeny the choice that plaintiff was faced with simply did not rise to constitutional proportions. 152
Employing this extraordinary rationale, the court upheld as constitu149. Id. at 277-78 (footnote omitted).
150. E.g., Pinkney v. District of Columbia, 439 F. Supp. 519, 533 (D.D.C. 1977); Allen
v. Greensboro, 322 F. Supp. 873, 877 (M.D.N.C. 1971); Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320
F. Supp. 1213, 1220 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Civil Serv. Ass'n, Local 400 v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 455, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1983); cf. Matter of
Glancey,- Pa. -, -, 527 A.2d 997, 1002-03 (1987) Gudge who refused to answer
a question on a required financial disclosure form, based on the fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, could be removed from office for misconduct). This misunderstanding also affects the commentators. See Recent Decisions, 33 ALB. L. REV. 397, 403 (1969); see also Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties
and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379,
415-16 n.116 (1976).
151. 439 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1977).
152. Id. at 533-34 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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tiona} the same conduct expressly prohibited by Garrity and Gardner as a
violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. 153
Some courts have adopted similar reasoning to hold that law enforcement officers may be required to take polygraph examinations as
part of their work related responsibilities. Frequently, courts fail even to
recognize that polygraph examinations present a fifth amendment Garrity and Gardner problem. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Richardson v. City of Pasadena, 154 upheld a dismissal for insubordination
based on refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Using language
remarkably similar to cases from the pre-incorporation era, the court
said:
By accepting public employment as a police officer he
subordinated his right of privacy as a private citizen to the superior right of the public to an efficient and credible police department. A police officer is guilty of insubordination in
refusing a direct order of a superior officer to submit to a polygraph examination during a departmental investigation of a
matter relating to efficiency and credibility when reasonable
cause exists to believe that the police officer so ordered can supply relevant knowledge or information. Insubordination in refusing a reasonable and constitutional command cannot be
upheld without jeopardizing the system of police administration which is premised on discipline. 155
Even those courts that do recognize polygraph tests as presenting a fifth
amendment Garrity and Gardner issue frequently rule against the law
enforcement officer on the merits of the claim. 156
153. A different version of being "only slightly unconstitutional" is DeWalt v. Barger,
490 F. Supp. 1262 (M.D. Pa. 1980). After quoting Pinkney, the court supported its
conclusion that the officer's six week suspension and transfer did not unconstitutionally infringe on his fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
in part, because he may have been "suspended and transferred not only for invoking
his fifth amendment rights but also for violating ... the Pennsylvania State Police
Field Regulation." /d. at 1272 n.6. Justice Douglas stated in Garrity that police
officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights [and] a
State may not condition [the exercise of a constitutional right] by the exaction of a
price." Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
154. 500 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 513 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.
1974) (indefinite suspension and permanent dismissal was lawful for refusing to submit to polygraph examination that was not unreasonable).
155. /d. at 177.
156. Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (15-day suspension upheld
as not violative of the fifth amendment or due process); Rivera v. Douglas, 132 Ariz.
117, 644 P.2d 271 (1982) (directive to submit to polygraph examination did not
violate the fifth amendment and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious);
Eshelman v. Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376, 560 P.2d 1283 (1977) (dismissal for refusal to
submit to polygraph examination upheld because "the officer [was] informed (1)
that the questions [related] specifically and narrowly to the performance of his official duties, (2) answers [could not] be used against him in any subsequent criminal
prosecution, and (3) that the penalty for refusing [was] dismissal").
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An even more significant misunderstanding of the doctrine of Garrity and Gardner is the notion that a law enforcement officer may be
forced to choose between the constitutional privilege against compelled
self-incrimination and a career if the law enforcement agency, in questioning the officer, limits its questions to those "specifically, directly, and
narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties." 157 This misunderstanding results from a reading of the Gardner dicta out of context.158 The Gardner dicta stands for the proposition that if a law
enforcement officer is granted immunity, but nonetheless refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the officer may be dismissed. The thrust of this proposition is that,
in order to punish for failure to answer questions, the law enforcement
agency must provide as much protection as it is requiring the law enforcement officer to relinquish; that is, immunity must be granted in exchange for the officer's relinquishment of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.
The Gardner requirement that questions be "specifically, directly,
and narrowly" related to the performance of official duties 159 provides
further limitation on the law enforcement agency. Thus, not only must
immunity be granted, there can be no dismissal unless the incriminating
answer is in response to an employment-related inquiry. A number of
courts, in direct contravention of Garrity and Gardner, permit disciplinary action against law enforcement officers simply because the questions
asked are official in nature, even though the principal requirement that
the officer be granted immunity has not been satisfied. 160
157. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
158. The language of the dicta in Gardner is as follows:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his
answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself, Garrity
v. New Jersey, supra, the privilege against self-incrimination would not
have been a bar to his dismissal.
/d. at 278 (footnote omitted).
Although the problem arises from a misreading of Gardner, the problem may
be slightly exacerbated by use of the unofficial version, published by the West Publishing Company, which incorrectly breaks this one-sentence quote into two
sentences by placing a period instead of a comma after "himself" and before "Garrity." 88 S. Ct. at 1916. The unofficial version published by the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company is consistent with the official United States Reports. 20 L.
Ed. 2d at 1086-87.
159. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278.
160. In O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976), the court upheld a 30day suspension for failure to answer questions on a financial disclosure form. In
rejecting the fifth amendment claim, the court held that, as long as the questions are
specifically, directly, and narrowly related to official duties, the "privilege [against
compelled self-incrimination] is not infringed when public employees are dismissed
for failing to answer questions . . . ."
In Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1974), the court
upheld withdrawal of a Department of Defense security clearance for access to classified information because of the failure to answer questions on interrogatories relat-
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Misunderstanding the Immunity Requirement

The immunity requirement is described in the dicta of Gardner,
Sanitation Men, and Turley. These cases stand for the proposition that a
law enforcement officer may be dismissed if he is provided with immunity but nonetheless refuses to answer questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly related to official duties. Gardner's reference to immunity is as
follows:
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of
his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity
with respect to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a
criminal prosecution of himself, . . . the privilege against selfincrimination would not have been a bar to his dismissal. 161
In Sanitation Men, the companion case to Gardner, the immunity
requirement was further explained:
As we stated in Gardner v. Broderick, if New York had
demanded that petitioners answer questio·ns specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official
duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be
entirely different.t62
In Turley, the immunity requirement was clarified even further:
Although due regard for the Fifth Amendment forbids the
State to compel incriminating answers from its employees and
contractors that may be used against them in criminal proceedings, the Constitution permits that very testimony to be coming to alleged homosexual conduct. Relying on Gardner and Sanitation Men, the
court validated the action because it was not "the result of some governmental suspicion concerning his alleged homosexual conduct, but ... was based on the inability of the government to continue its clearance procedure without Marks first
disclosing additional information."
In Matter of Glancy, - Pa. -, 527 A.2d 997 (1987), the court upheld the
recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry Panel Review Board that the judge be removed from office. The court stated:
[A]lthough compliance with the reporting requirement is compulsory in
the sense that one's right to hold judicial office is conditioned upon it,
there is not present the demand for total relinquishment of fifth amendment rights. Moreover, the inquiry put to a judge by Question 11 is a type
which "specifically, directly and narrowly" relates to the performance of
his official duties.
Id. at-, 527 A.2d at 1005; see also Napolitano v. Ward, 317 F. Supp. 83, 84 (N.D.
Ill. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1037, reh'g denied,
410 U.S. 947 (1972) (denial of motion of a removed judge to prevent nomination of
candidates to fill the judicial vacancy caused by his removal).
161. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278 (footnoted omitted) (emphasis added).
162. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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pel/ed if neither it nor its fruits are available for such use....
Furthermore, the accommodations between the interest of the
State and the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have
means at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony is still refused. This is recognized by the
power of the courts to compel testimony after a grant of immunity by use of civil contempt and coerced imprisonment. . . .
Also, given adequate immunity, the State may plainly insist
that employees either answer questions under oath about the
performance of their job or suffer the loss of employment. 163
Although compelled testimony may not be used directly or derivatively against an officer in a criminal proceeding, the dicta of Gardner,
Sanitation Men, and Turley indicate that compelled testimony may be
used against the officer in an administrative or other civil proceeding,
provided the testimony follows a grant of immunity. If the fifth amendment privilege is properly protected by a grant of immunity, the content
of answers to specific employment-related questions, as well as the failure
to answer such questions, can result in disciplinary actiori and dismissal.
What is less clear from the dicta of these cases is the meaning of
"immunity." These cases permit three interpretations of the protection
required by the fifth amendment in order to dismiss an officer because of
either his refusal to answer or the content of his compelled statement.
The three possible minimal levels of fifth amendment protection are: (1)
a formal grant of immunity, (2) Miranda-like warnings that no compelled statement or other evidence derived from a compelled statement
can· be admitted in any criminal proceeding; and (3) neither a grant of
immunity nor Miranda-like warnings. The third interpretation is based
on the assumption that the holding of Garrity will be self-executing for
the officer, providing an automatic immunity as a matter of law.
Resolution of the immunity question requires examination of the
Supreme Court's seminal immunity case, Kastigar v. United States, 164 decided after Gardner and Sanitation Men but before Turley and Cunningham. In Kastigar, the Court established the fifth amendment immunity
standard as "use and derivative use" immunity. Under use and derivative use immunity, an individual who has been granted immunity may be
prosecuted criminally for crimes arising from the criminal transaction in
reference to which testimony was compelled. 165 However, the prosecutor
may not use the compelled testimony or any information obtained directly or indirectly from such testimony. 16 6
163. Turley, 414 U.S. at 84 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
164. 406 U.S. 441 (1972); see Shennan, supra note 36, at 24-34 (brief history of statutory
immunity); Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56 TEX. L.
REV. 791, 797-814 (1978).
165. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-54.
166. Id. at 454.
The constitutional inquiry, . . . is whether the immunity granted
under this statute is coextensive with the scope of the privilege. If so,
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Gardner, Sanitation Men, Turley, and Cunningham were each decided in the context of a statute requiring the affirmative waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In Gardner and Sanitation Men, decided prior to Kastigar, the Court found unconstitutional the requirement that the officer affirmatively waive
immunity, but the Court did not address what, if any, affirmative obligation the government might have. After Kastigar, dicta in Turley and
Cunningham strongly suggest that a formal grant of immunity is
required.
a.

Interpretation One: Formal Grant of Immunity

In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 167 the Court stated that the fifth amendment
requires an affirmative grant of immunity by the State and prohibits requiring ari affirmative waiver by the defendant. The Court explained that
"if answers are to be required . . . States must offer to the witness
whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege and may not
insist that the employee ... waive such immunity." 168 Further supporting the interpretation that the Court intended a formal grant of immunity is its discussion of the consequences of the refusal to answer
questions after a grant of immunity. The Court stated:
[T]he accommodation between the interest of the State and the
Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplied and testimony
is still refused. This is recognized by the power of the courts to
compel testimony, after a grant of immunity, by use of civil
contempt and coerced imprisonment. 169
In addition, the Turley Court referred with approval to the Kastigar standard of use and derivative use as the scope of the immunity grant necessary to comport with the fifth amendment. 170 Thus, the soundest reading
of the Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley dicta, particularly in light of
Kastigar, is that a formal grant of use and derivative use immunity is
required in order to compel testimony when administrative dismissal is
the sanction for either the failure to testify or for information revealed in
testimony that supports a "for cause" dismissal. Anything less than a
formal grant of immunity is probably less than the Supreme Court contemplated. Moreover, only "interpretation one" provides the procedural
safeguards necessary to protect the officer.
Nonetheless, lower courts have failed to recognize this interpreta-

167.
168.
169.
170.

petitioners' refusals to answer based on the privilege were unjustified, and
the judgments of contempt were proper, for the grant of immunity has
removed the dangers against which the privilege protects.
ld. at 149 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
414 u.s. 70 (1973).
ld. at 85 (emphasis added).
ld. at 84.
ld. at 85.
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tion of immunity as being required by the Supreme Court. There are
probably two reasons for this misunderstanding. First, Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley were each decided in the context of a statute that
unconstitutionally required an affirmative waiver by the individual of his
or her fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
As a consequence of the holdings in these cases, there are no longer statutes in effect that require individuals to waive formally the fifth amend. ment privilege. Because the issue is no longer "can the government
require the defendant to waive immunity," but is now a question of
"what affirmative obligation, if any, does the government have to establish immunity," the significance of the immunity discussion in these cases
is easily lost or the cases are incorrectly distinguished, or both. Because
the immunity language of these cases is sometimes seen solely as referring to the now defunct waiver of immunity statutes, the issue of whether
the government must provide immunity and, if so, what is constitutionally required for immunity is either misunderstood or perceived as inapplicable to the case at bar.
Second, even conscientious attempts on the part of courts to resolve
the immunity question often produce inadequate results because of reliance solely on Gardner for the immunity dicta. Garrity and Gardner are
the landmark decisions on the fifth amendment rights of law enforcement
officers. Turley, on the other hand, is not the seminal case and involved a
non-public employee's right to contract with the government. Reliance
on Garrity and Gardner, instead of Turley, is natural when resolving law
enforcement officer cases.
Unfortunately, when attempting to resolve the immunity issue, reliance on Garrity and Gardner, while ignoring Turley, is a fatal flaw. Garrity does not contain the immunity requirement. Gardner, of course,
does. However, both Gardner and its companion case, Sanitation Men,
were decided four years before Kastigar. Turley, decided a year after the
landmark immunity case of Kastigar, is the most recent, most complete,
and most clear articulation of the Court. The Turley immunity language,
when read in pari materia with Kastigar, strongly suggests that the immunity requirement of Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley is a formal
grant of use and derivative use immunity.
b.

Interpretation Two: Miranda-Like Warnings

A middle ground position requires that the law enforcement officer
be given Miranda-like warnings. Under this approach, a formal grant of
immunity is not required on the theory that Garrity provides immunity
as a matter oflaw. However, unlike the self-executing theory of the third
interpretation, the second interpretation requires that the law enforcement officer be "duly advised of his options and the consequences of his
choice." 171 As the Supreme Court of California stated, "The logic un171. Westen v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943,948 (Fed.
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derlying Gardner is that an officer under investigation is not required to
speculate as to what his constitutional rights are." 172 The second interpretation requires that the law enforcement officer be advised of the Garrity exclusionary rule, which provides that no statement given under
threat of adverse personnel action can be used against the officer in a
criminal proceeding. Moreover, no evidence derived directly or indirectly from a compelled statement may be used in a criminal proceeding.
Although this notification is not as protective as a formal grant ofimmunity, it is probably sufficient to satisfy the constitutional minimum.
The Second Circuit adopted this position when confronted with the
immunity issue in Sanitation Men, following the remand by the Supreme
Court. The sanitation department reinstated the plaintiffs, called them to
appear at an inquiry, and advised them: (1) that any answers they provided or any evidence derived from their answers could not be used
against them in a criminal case, and (2) that failure to answer could result in disciplinary action. 173 The sanitation workers asserted their fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, were charged
with misconduct, and, following a hearing, were dismissed. The district
court granted the sanitation workers' motion for summary judgment,
adopting the position that a formal grant of immunity was required and
that the City of New York lacked the statutory authority to grant
immunity. 174
Cir. 1983); Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1393 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commission of Sanitation, 426 F.2d 619, 627 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 961 (1972).
172. Lybarger v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 822, 834, 710 P.2d 329, 336, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 529, 536 (1985) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
173. The Deputy Administrator read the following "warnings" to each interrogated
employee:
[Y]ou have all the rights and privileges guaranteed by the Laws of the
State of New York and the Constitution of the United States, including
the right ... to remain silent, although you may be subject to disciplinary
action by the Department . . . for failure to answer material questions
relating to the performance of your duties as an employee of the City of
New York.
I further advise you that the answers you may give to the questions
propounded to you at this proceeding, or any information or evidence
which is gained by reason of your answer, may not be used against you in
a criminal proceeding except that you may be subject to criminal prosecution for any false answer ....
Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 621; accord United States ex rei Annunziato v. Deegan,
440 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1971); see Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391, 1396
(Ct. Cl. 1973) (emphasizing that warnings must include evidence derived from the
compelled statements and not just the statements themselves); Eshelman v.
Blubaum, 114 Ariz. 376, 378-79, 560 P.2d 1283, 1285-86 (1977) (must also be advised that questions will relate specifically, narrowly, and directly to the performance of official duties); Rivera v. Douglas, 132 Ariz. 117, 644 P.2d 271 (1982); see
also Westen v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 724 F.2d 943, 951
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (when the public employee was properly advised of rights, it was
immaterial that her counsel did not understand their significance).
174. Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 621-22.
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Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, reversed, holding
that it was sufficient that the workers were advised of the use and derivative use exclusionary rule. The court stated that Garrity and Gardner
implicitly stand for the proposition that it is not necessary to have a formal grant of immunity, 175 notwithstanding Justice Fortas' reference in
Sanitation Men to "proper proceedings." 176 The court held that proper
proceedings means "proceedings, such as those held here, in which the
employee is asked only pertinent questions about the performance of his
duties and is duly advised of his options and the consequences of his
choice." 177 Moreover, the court also held that it was immaterial that
there was no statute authorizing a grant of immunity. Accordingly, the
court dismissed as inapplicable the provision of the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure that restricted the granting of immunity to "comp~
tent authority." 178
The Seventh Circuit, in Confederation of Police v. Con fisk, 179 implicitly adopted the middle ground position. The court noted that the police
officers in that case were never informed, either at the grand jury proceeding or at the departmental inquiry, that any information they gave
could not be used against them in a criminal proceeding.1 80 The court
dismissed the department's argument that the internal affairs division
(lAD) is not empowered to grant immunity, holding that such power is
not necessary under Garrity. The court stated:
In Garrity, the Supreme Court indicated that the Fifth
Amendment itself prohibited the use of statements or their
fruits where the statements had been made under the threat of
dismissal from public office. Therefore, by advising the officers
that their statements, when given under threat of discharge,
cannot be used against them in subsequent proceedings, the
lAD is not "granting" immunity from prosecution; it is merely
advising the officers of the constitutional limitations on any
criminal prosecution should they answer. 181
c.

Interpretation Three: Self-Executing Immunity

The final position is that the authorities are not required either to
grant immunity or to inform the officer of the exclusionary rule. This
/d. at 626-27.
Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 285.
Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 627.
/d. at 627-28. This case, decided two years before Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972), established the constitutional minimum for a grant of immunity as
"use and derivative use." Thus, Judge Friendly was not only struggling with the
need for a grant of immunity versus an exclusionary device, but also with what a
grant of immunity means- transactional immunity, use and derviative use immunity, or use immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 239-48.
179. 489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., 416 U.S. 956 (1974).
180. /d. at 895.
181. /d. at 895 n.4 (citing Sanitation Men, 426 F.2d at 627) (emphasis in original).

175.
176.
177.
178.
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position is premised on the notion that the Garrity holding is self-executing, providing immunity as a matter of law, because statements given
under threat of adverse personnel action are coerced and, as such, are
always suppressed as compelled self-incrimination. This analysis is
faulty because it compels a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege without providing a formal grant of immunity or at least expressly advising of
the exclusionary rule resulting from Garrity. Nonetheless, this approach
is often taken by law enforcement agencies and frequently sanctioned by
the courts.
The interpretation of a Garrity self-executing immunity has been applied with unfortunate results. In Gulden v. McCork/e, 182 two public employees were discharged for refusing to submit to polygraph
examinations and for refusing to sign departmental waivers that the examinations were conducted consensually. 183 In their suit for reinstatement, the employees argued that the employer was required to "make an
affirmative tender of immunity" once the employees articulated their fifth
amendment concerns. 184 Rejecting this position, the Fifth Circuit held
·
that:
An employee who is compelled to answer questions (but who is
not compelled to waive immunity) is protected by Garrity from
subsequent use of those answers in a criminal prosecution. It is
the very fact that the testimony was compelled which prevents
its use in subsequent proceedings .... Failure to tender immunity was simply not the equivalent of an impermissible compelled waiver of immunity.1ss
If Garrity were the self-executing "immunity statute" that this third
approach indicates, the Supreme Court would not have felt the need to
issue its decisions in Gardner or Sanitation Men in 1968, Turley in 1973,
182.
183.
184.
185.

680 F.2d 1070, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (5th Cir. 1982).
/d. at 1071.
/d. at 1074.
/d. at 1075. The court went on to state that "[w]e, however, decline to answer the
highly speculative question whether an affirmative grant of immunity might, at some
point, be necessary under controlling Supreme Court authority." /d. (emphasis in
original). Other courts have held that immunity is an automatic self-executing constitutional protection. Womer v. Hampton, 496 F.2d 99, 108 (5th Cir. 1977) (statements and fruit cannot be used anyway under Garrity; therefore, there is no need
for warnings); accord DeWalt v. Barger, 490 F. Supp. 1262, 1272 (M.D. Pa. 1980);
Hank v. Codd, 424 F. Supp. 1086, 1087 ("immunity ... flows automatically from
the Supreme Court's decision in Garrity"); Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213,
1217 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (same as to compelled polygraph examination). In Gerace v.
County of Los Angeles, 100 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), the California
Court of Appeal found automatic self-executing immunity, stating:
When the department chose to invoke administrative procedures to
inquire into their fitness as police officers and most particularly when they
chose to compel answers by invoking the Manual of Policy and Ethics, the
appellants became secure from prosecution as surely as if a grant of immunity had been given to them.
100 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
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or Cunningham in 1977. If Garrity granted automatic immunity, then
the plaintiffs in these four cases could not have argued successfully that
their fifth amendment rights had been abridged or chilled and those
plaintiffs could have been lawfully discharged, barred from contracting,
or barred from public office.
The practical effects of the three different interpretations - granting
immunity, providing warnings, or doing neither- are quite different.
For example, if a law enforcement officer is asked a narrow, employmentrelated question during an internal investigation and refuses to answer,
he could be charged with violating departmental rules and regulations
prohibiting conduct unbecoming an officer, insubordination, or both.
The legality of the officer's subsequent dismissal depends on whether the
officer's case is governed by the Gardner holding or the Gardner immunity dicta. If it comes within the Gardner holding, it is unconstitutional
for the authorities to take, or threaten to take, any adverse personnel
action to punish an asserted fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. If, on the other hand, the situation comes within the
Gardner immunity dicta, the officer could be discharged for cause. The
question turns on whether the officer's fifth amendment privilege has
been protected. If the privilege has not been secured, and the officer is
forced to choose between the exercise of constitutional rights and continued employment, then the officials have strayed into unconstitutional territory. If, on the other hand, the officer's privilege against compelled
self-incrimination has been constitutionally insured through immunity,
yet the officer refuses to answer questions narrowly related to job performance, then the officer has exposed himself to proper disciplinary
action.
As the prior survey of cases indicates, courts have misconstrued
Supreme Court authority in several fundamental respects. The lack of
understanding of the concept of immunity set forth in Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley forces upon law enforcement officers the same Hobson's choice that a unanimous Supreme Court intended to eliminate two
decades ago. The rationale of many courts is that Garrity provides an
automatic immunity so that the officer should have no fear that the statement would ever be used against him criminally. Under this overly
broad reading of Garrity, the officer does not have a right to assert a fifth
amendment privilege, and the authorities are within their discretion to
dismiss the officer from the police force. Thus, instead of applying Garrity, Gardner, and their progeny to vindicate the fifth amendment rights
of law enforcement officers, courts have applied those cases to sanction
yet another generation of constitutional infringement.
IV.

THE STATUTORY BILL OF RIGHTS ERA

Any optimism that law enforcement officers may have experienced
following Garrity and Gardner must have been short-lived in light of the
judicial and administrative response to these decisions. Courts did not
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appear to understand and frequently failed to apply the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. There was, therefore, no incentive for police departments
to change internal investigatory policies. Because the executive and judicial branches were still treating law enforcement officers as constitutionally inferior, Congress, as well as some state legislatures, began to
address the problem.

A.

The Failed Federal Attempt

Since 1970, seventy-two bills have been introduced in the United
States Congress in an attempt to enact a law enforcement officers' bill of
rights.l 86 Fifty-two of these bills were introduced between 1973 and
1977. Most of these bills were introduced as amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 187 The approach of
these bills was to force states to enact legislation substantially similar to
186. H.R. 19,734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16,039, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972);
H.R. 163, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 266, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R.
269, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 394, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 527,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 808, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1209, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1834, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 1944, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2149, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 2383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 3226, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4477, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4598, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4599, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4600, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4901, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 5436, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6632, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 6633, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H;R. 7406, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 8604, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 9035, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 9542, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11,638, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 413, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 843, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1654, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3919, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 4476, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 4762, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5338, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5476, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 5862, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 6941, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 7215, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8805, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 10,285, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,253, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 12,227, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 518, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1030, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1225, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 1851, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 2801, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5787, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6716, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6717, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6718, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 13,687, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 101, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1226, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2443, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2899, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3836, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 2301, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 36, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 354, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 525, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3596, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); S. 1168, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 28, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 1894, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3037, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); H.R. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 175, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); H.R. 482, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
187. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified.as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-29, 251021; 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1201-03; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-96c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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the proposed federal law enforcement officers' bill of rights by denying
funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 188 to those
states that failed to comply. 189 All seventy-two bills were referred to the
Judiciary Committee, which conducted hearings on only two of the bills.
None of the bills, however, was reported out of committee. Nonetheless,
the existence of these bills - even though never enacted - as well as the
testimony of their proponents, confirmed the presence and the extent of
the law enforcement officer's fifth amendment dilemma.
The theme echoed on the floor of Congress for almost two decades
has been that law enforcement officers are not demanding special privileges but are merely seeking the privileges afforded other citizens. Proponents of federal legislation for law enforcement officers have observed
that officers experience frustration, a sense of isolation, and low morale
because they enjoy fewer rights than ordinary citizens. In 1972, New
York Congressman Edward Koch, now Mayor of New York City, argued before Congress, in conjunction with his cosponsorhip of a bill of
rights for law enforcement officers, that the legislation would simply insure that officers receive the rights to which they are already entitled as
citizens. He stated:
This bill does not provide any special privileges for police officers; it simply affirms the rights they are due as citizens of this
country. It is unfortunate that in a nation like ours such a bill
is needed; but history has shown all too often that policemen's
rights are abridged by local department regulations and procedures. In some communities, ... when -~ccused of malfeasance,
[police officers] are not given the same rights and protections
accorded ordinary citizens.. Furthermore, an imbalance has
evolved because, while we have taken steps to insure the rights
of defendants and complainants, we have failed to protect the
rights of policemen.t9o
The following year, Illinois Congressman Frank Annunzio, upon introducing legislation on behalf of law enforcement officers, similarly re188. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was created by the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. /d. 42 U.S.C. §§ 370l-96c. The Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration ceased operation, due to a lack of appropriations, on April 15, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 16,694 (1982).
189. Illinois Congressman Frank Annunzio, speaking on behalf of two of the bills,
explained:
[T)he law enforcement officers bill of rights ... is identical to legislation cosponsored by 125 colleagues in the 92d Congress. It would ...
guarantee police officers the same civil rights enjoyed by all other citizens;
set up a grievance panel to hear the grievances of police officers who claim
their civil rights had been violated; and would deny LEAA funds to any
community that did not conform to the provisions of this bill.
119 CONG. REC. H2051 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973).
190. 118 CONG. REC. H23,900 (daily ed. June 30, 1972).
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marked that he sought only to afford officers the same legal protection
that all other citizens enjoy.
It is regrettable that legislation of this nature is needed at
all. Law enforcement officers should be entitled to the same
protection of the laws they are required to enforce. Policemen
should be as free of intimidation and harassment during the
process of a hearing as is the average citizen .... 191
In 1976, a bill was introduced on the floor of the House of Representatives as an amendment to Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968. 192 Its major protections included (1) procedural safeguards during investigation and interrogation, (2) a prohibition
against punitive action and adverse inference in return for assertion of
the fifth amendment, unless provided immunity from prosecution, (3) the
right to an attorney or another chosen representative present during interrogation, (4) a prohibition against retaliation for the exercise of any of
the protections provided, (5) a grievance process to investigate law enforcement officers' complaints of denial of any of the protections provided, and (6) the right to bring a Civil suit against anyone violating any
of the protections provided. 193 Illinois Congressman Martin Russo,
191. 119 CONG. REC. H2051 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973).
192. 122 CONG. REC. H28,947-49 (daily ed. Sep. 2, 1976).
193. The proposed law enforcement officers' bill of rights provided in part:
[N]o grant ... shall be made ... to any State: .. unless there is in effect
with respect to such State ... a law enforcement officers' bill of rights
which substantially provides as a minimum the following rights for the
law enforcement officers of such State ....
RIGHTS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
WHILE UNDER INVESTIGATION
Sec. 2. Whenever a law enforcement officer is under investigation for
alleged malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance of official duty, with a
view to possible disciplinary action, demotion, dismissal, or criminal
charges, the following minimum standards shall apply:
(I) No adverse inference shall be drawn and no punitive action taken
from a refusal of the law enforcement officer being investigated to participate in such investigation or be interrogated other than when such law
enforcement officer is on duty, or when exigent circumstances otherwise
require.
(2) Any interrogation of a law enforcement officer shall take place at
the offices of those conducting the investigation, the place where such law
enforcement officer reports for duty, or such other reasonable place as the
investigator may determine.
(3) The law enforcement officer being investigated shall be informed,
at the commencement of any interrogation, of the nature of the investigation, the names of any complainants, and the identity and authority of the
person conducting such investigation, and at the commencement of any
interrogation of such officer in connection with any such investigation
shall be informed of all persons present during such interrogation. All
questions asked in any such interrogation shall be asked by or through a
single interrogator.
(4) No formal proceeding which has authority to penalize a law en-
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speaking on behalf of the legislation, stated:
At this late stage of our Nation's history, it seems an
anomaly to me that our country's courageous law enforcement
officials should be denied the same constitutional protections
guaranteed to all other Americans. Many Americans take
these liberties and rights for granted, but for those citizens who
have ever experienced life without them the saga reads very differently. Congress has extended these safeguards to other
groups not previously protected and should continue this process today. This amendment seeks to add legislative substance
to the constitutional provisions that protect citizens who are
under criminal investigations. 194
On September 2, 1976, after six years of unfavorable committee consideration, a federal law enforcement officers' bill of rights, voted upon as
a floor amendment to another bill, was defeated 213 to 148, and no similar legislation has reached the floor of the House of Representatives or
the United States Senate since. The activity at the national level, however, has provided an impetus for similar activity in at least a few state
legislatures.

B.

The Maryland Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights

In 1974, Maryland became the first state to enact a law enforcement
officers' bill of rights (LEOBOR). 195 The primary purpose of the LEforcement officer may be brought except upon charges signed by the persons making those charges.
(5) Any interrogation of a Jaw enforcement officer in connection with
an investigation shall be for a reasonable period of time, and shall allow
for reasonable periods for the rest and personal necessities of such Jaw
enforcement officer.
(6) No threat, harassment, promise, or reward shall be made to any
law enforcement officer in connection with an investigation in order to
induce the answering of any question, but immunity from prosecution may
be offered to induce such answering.
(7) All interrogatories of any law enforcement officer in connection
with the investigation shall be recorded in full.
(8) The Jaw enforcement officer shall be entitled to the presence of his
counsel or any other one person of his choice at any interrogation in connection with the investigation.
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Sec. 6. Whenever a personnel action which will result in any loss of
pay or benefits, or is otherwise punitive is taken against a Jaw enforcement
officer, such Jaw enforcement officer shall be notified of such action and
the reasons therefor a reasonable time before such action takes effect.
RETALIATION FOR EXERCISING RIGHTS
Sec. 7. There shall be no penalty nor threat of any penalty for the
exercise by a law enforcement officer of his rights under this Bill of Rights.
122 CONG. REC. H28,947-48 (daily ed. Sep. 2, 1976).
194. /d. at H28,950.
195. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 722, 1974 Mo. LAWS 2471-77 (codified as amended at
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OBOR is to provide substantive and procedural protections during disciplinary investigations, interrogations, and hearings. As noted by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, "[i]n enacting the LEOBOR, the
Legislature vested in law-enforcement officers certain 'rights' not available to the general public." 196 The protections provided by the LEOBOR that are relevant to this article are contained in sections 728, 733,
and 734 of article 27 of the Maryland Annotated Code. 197
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 727-7340 (1987)). The LEOBOR has been amended
21 times. Additionally, there are six bills before the 1988 session of the Maryland
General Assembly. H. 411, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; H. 428, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; H.
453, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S. 40, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S. 82, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.; S.
227, 1988 Md. Leg. Sess.
196. Nichols v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 53 Md. App. 623, 627, 455 A.2d 446, 449, cen.
denied, 296 Md. 111 (1983). But see Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md. App. 510, 523,
473 A.2d 960, 967 (1984) ("to some extent, by supplanting local merit system laws
to which some police officers formerly were subject, LEOB[O]R may in fact have
lessened their procedural rights"). A bill introduced in the 1988 Maryland General
Assembly would permit a law enforcement officer to "elect, in the alternative [to the
LEOBOR], the procedural or substantive rights or guarantees provided under a collective bargaining agreement." The bill would further provide that LEOBOR
"rights ... may not be diminished or abrogated by any law, ordinance, or regulation
... or by any provision of any collective bargaining agreement." S. 227, 1988 Md.
Leg. Sess.; see also Abbott v. Admin. Hearing Bd., 33 Md. App. 681, 688, 366 A.2d
756, 760 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 727 (1977) (LEOBOR preempted county's
merit system ordinance, which did not violate the equal protection clause by treating police officers differently, because "[t]he nature of the duties of police officers is
sufficiently different from those of other public employees to justify the establishment of different procedures to be employed in disciplinary actions involving police
officers").
197. The sections of the LEOBOR not covered in this article are as follows: The definitions in section 727 establish which individuals and situations are within the scope
of the LEOBOR. Specifically, subsection 727(b) defines "law enforcement officer"
as any person who (1) is authorized to make arrests, and (2) is a member of one of
nine classes of law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Sheriff of Baltimore City v. Abshire, 44 Md. App. 256, 263-64,408 A.2d 398, 402 (1979), cen. denied, 287 Md. 756
(1980) (subsection 727(b)(5) includes the office of sheriff of any county, but the legislature excluded Baltimore City because its deputies were included in the State Merit
System Law). Subsection 727(c) excludes any officer serving in a probationary status upon initial entry into a law enforcement agency, except when brutality is alleged. To attain the permanent status necessary to come within the protection of
the LEOBOR, the officer must complete successfully the police training course established by the Police Training Commission. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-201
(1986 & Supp. 1987); see Moore v. Fairmount Heights, 285 Md. 578, 585-86, 403
A.2d 1252, 1256 (1979). The LEOBOR has presented some practical problems by
including within its protections officers who arguably should not have been included
because they serve elected officials who have the constitutionally sanctioned power
to appoint and to terminate subordinates. In Allgood v. State, 43 Md. App. 187,
403 A.2d 83 7 ( 1979), a deputy sheriff, serving at the pleasure of the elected sheriff,
argued that the LEOBOR "should be construed as a tenure provision and at the
very least sufficiently so as to require a law enforcement officer's employer to justify
a dismissal .... " /d. at 190,403 A.2d at 839. The court of special appeals recognized that, even though the officer had no tenure and served at the pleasure of the
sheriff, section 733 might preclude dismissal in response to the exercise or demand
of a constitutional right. However, the court affirmed the ruling that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim because the section 733 argument was raised for the first time
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Section 728 198 establishes procedural safeguards during interrogaon appeal. /d. at 191, 403 A.2d at 839-40. The following year, in addressing the
case of a non-tenured police chief who served at the pleasure of the county executive, the court of appeals held that although the LEOBOR excluded certain probationary officers from its scope, it did not exclude non-tenured officers or police
chiefs. DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437, 446, 418 A.2d 1191, 1196-97
( 1980). In an attempt to reconcile the police chief's LEOBOR rights with the newly
elected county executive's right to appoint whomever he pleased, the court held that
the police chief could be replaced for any reason other than the lawful exercise of his
constitutional rights, in this case first amendment freedom of speech. /d. at 44 7-54,
418 A.2d at 1197-1201. Subsequent to DiGrazia, the legislature excluded from LEOBOR coverage (1) officers serving at the pleasure of a charter county, Act of May
12, 1981, ch. 328, 1981 Mo. LAws 1675, 1676, and (2) police chiefs of any incorporated city or town. Act of May 4, 1982, ch. 204, 1982 LAws 1716; see also Windsor
v. Bozman, 68 Md. App. 223, 511 A.2d 69, cert. denied, 308 Md. 237, 517 A.2d
1120 (1986).
Subsection 728(a) provides a right to engage in political activity when off duty.
Section 729 provides a protection against disclosure of assets except during a conflict of interest investigation or when required by state or federal law. Section 729A
provides for the regulation of secondary employment. Section 730 provides for a
hearing prior to any adverse personnel actions recommended as a result of investigation or interrogation, except for summary punishment, emergency suspension, or if
the officer is convicted of a felony. Section 731 provides for the procedure for hearing board decisions on the merits, as well as recommendations for punishment. Section 732 provides for appeals of hearing board decisions to the appropriate circuit
court. Section 734A provides for summary punishment for minor departmental violations with the consent of the officer. Section 734B provides for preemption by the
LEOBOR of other state and local laws. Section 734C controls false statements.
Section 7340 permits an officer's waiver of LEOBOR rights.
198. The procedural protections of subsection 728(b). not discussed textually are as follows: Subsection 728(b)(l2) prohibits placing adverse material in a personnel file
without providing an opportunity, unless waived, to review and respond in writing.
It also provides a procedure for expungement. Subsection 728(b)(l2) was included
in the original act, but as an amendment and not as part of the pre-filed bill. See H.
354, 1974 Md. Leg. Sess. Subsection 728(b)(5)(i) requires notification of the nature
of the investigation prior to interrogation. Subsection 728(b)(3) requires notification
of the name of the officer in charge of the investigation, as well as those present
during any interrogation, and limits questioning to one interrogator per interrogation session. In Widomski v. Chief of Police, 41 Md. App. 361, 397 A.2d 222, cert.
denied, 284 Md. 750 (1979), the court held that this subsection does not prohibit
successive interrogations, particularly when the questioning is conducted by a different interrogating officer in a different locale, provided successive interrogations do
not violate the requirement of subsection 728(b)(6) that any interrogation only continue for a reasonable period of time. /d. at 370-73, 397 A.2d at 228-29. Subsection
728(b)(9) requires Miranda warnings prior to interrogation of any officer under
arrest or likely to be placed under arrest. Subsections 728(b)(l) and (b)(6) require
that any interrogation take place at a reasonable time, preferably during duty hours,
unless there is an exigency, and continue only for a reasonable period of time. Subsection 728(b)(2) requires that any interrogation take place at a reasonable location,
preferably the office of the investigating officer or the police unit where the incident
allegedly occurred. Subsection 728(b)(l4) provides that polygraph examinations
may be administered without a representative present during the actual administration if(l) the questions have been reviewed by the law enforcement officer or representative, (2) the polygraph examination administration is observed by the
representative, and (3) the operator's report is made available within 10 days. Subsection 728(b)(5)(ii) requires notification of all charges and witnesses at least 10 days
prior to any hearing. Subsections 728(b)(5)(iii)-(iv) require a copy of exculpatory
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information at least 10 days prior to any hearing. Cf Chief, Montgomery County
Dep't of Police v. Jacocks, 50 Md. App. 132, 436 A.2d 930 (1981) (extending the
Jencks rule to LEOBOR proceedings). Subsection 728(b)(8) requires a copy of the
complete interrogation session, if requested, at least 10 days prior to any hearing.
This means that "the record may be wholly written, or wholly taped, or wholly
transcribed, or a combination of any two or more of the three methods, so long as
there is a complete and preserved record for the review by counsel and by a court, if
there be an appeal." Widomski, 41 Md. App. at 372-73, 397 A.2d at 229. Subsection 728(b)(4) limits investigations for brutality to duly sworn complaints filed
within ninety days of the alleged brutality. In Maryland State Police v. Resh, 65
Md. App. 167, 499 A.2d 1303 (1985), the court interpreted this subsection as placing a 90-day statute of limitations on brutality complaints received from outside the
law enforcement agency but placed no such limitation on brutality charges filed by
superior officers based on the information contained in the detailed report required
to be filed by any officer involved in an incident of injury as a result of force used to
make an arrest. /d. at 177, 499 A.2d at 1309; see also Walker v. Lindsey, 65 Md.
App. 402, 500 A.2d 1061 (1985) (permitting a complaint to be duly sworn by a
minor). Subsection 728(b)(10) provides for the right to have counsel present and
available for consultation at all times during interrogation. The "and available for
consultution" language was added in 1983. Act of May 31, 1983, ch. 660, 1983 Mo.
LAWS 2097. This amendment was in response to Nichols v. Baltimore Police Department, 53 Md. App. 623, 455 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 296 Md. Ill (1983), which
considered counsel's role to be merely that of interposing objections to questions as
in the taking of a deposition in a civil care. /d. at 629, 455 A.2d at 450. Subsection
728(b)(ll) preserves the law enforcement officer's right to file suit for any cause of
action arising out of official duties by assuring that neither statute nor regulation
will limit that right. This subsection was included in the original act, but as an
amendment and not as part of the pre-filed bill. See H. 354, 1974 Md. Leg. Sess.
Although the right to file civil suit cannot be limited by the legislature or the law
enforcement agency, it can and has been limited by the courts. If a citizen files a
false brutality complaint, for example, against an officer, resulting in a disciplinary
hearing at which the officer is exhonerated, and the officer then sues the citizen, the
cause of action would lie in malicious use of civil process, or defamation, or both.
For malicious use of civil process, the officer must prove that as a result of the
complaint, (1) the law enforcement agency initiated formal disciplinary proceedings,
(2) there was no probable cause for the proceeding, (3) the officer suffered a special
grievance greater than the inconvenience and cost of the proceedings, and (4) the
officer had to initiate formal proceedings to reattain his or her status. E.g., Imig v.
Ferrar, 70 Cal. App. 3d 48, 57-60, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540, 544-46 (1972). See generally
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 120 (5th ed. 1984). As for
defemation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md.
164, 498 A.2d 269 (1985), that because of the procedural safeguards of the LEOBOR, any citizen filing a brutality complaint has absolute immunity against a
cause of action in defamation. The court stated:
We are not unmindful of the deeply disturbing and demoralizing effect a false accusation of brutality may have on a law-enforcement officer .... It is regrettable that our holding here will, in some instances,
"alford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer." We
are satisfied, however, that the inhibition of citizens' criticism of those entrusted with their protection is a far worse evil.
/d. at 177, 498 A.2d at 275 (citations omitted). In Brady v. Mayor of Laurel, 40
Md. App. 373, 392 A.2d 89 (1978), a law enforcement officer was sued for breaking
a citizen's nose while in the course of his duties as an officer. The officer was denied
legal representation by the local government. After successfully defending t.he law
suit, he sued for reimbursement of his legal fees. The dismissal of his cause of action
was affirmed because there was no basis for recovery in tort or contract and because
subsection 728(b)(ll) was not violated. The court noted that" 'a policeman's lot is

496

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

tion and investigation of a law enforcement officer. 199 These protections
include rights guaranteed during 200 and subsequent to investigation; 201
rights prior to, 202 during, 203 and as a consequence of interrogation; 204
rights prior to a hearing; 205 a statute of limitation on brutality complaints;206 and the right to file suit. 207
The legislative counterparts to the applicable Supreme Court holdings and dicta are located in subsection 728(b)(7), subsection 728(c), section 733, and section 734. Subsection 728(b)(7)(i), the provision
implementing the Gardner holding, prohibits threats of disciplinary action against officers under investigation. 208 However, subsection 728(c)
permits transfers and reassignments that are not punitive in nature when
they are determined to be in the best interest of the internal management
of the law enforcement agency. 209
Subsection 728(b)(7)(ii), the provision implementing both the Garrity holding and the immunity requirement of Gardner and its progeny,
permits a law enforcement agency to require that the officer submit to (1)
tests for alcohol and controlled dangerous substances, (2) polygraph examinations, and (3) interrogations specifically relating to the subject of
the investigation. Noncompliance may result in disciplinary action, but
compliance makes all results inadmissible and nondiscoverable in a criminal proceeding. 210 Moreover, polygraph results are inadmissible, with-

199.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

210.

not a happy one,' but ... courts must deal with the law, not morals .... " /d. at
374, 392 A.2d at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
An interrogating or investigating officer can be any sworn law enforcement officer
or, if requested by the Governor, the Attorney General of Maryland or his or her
designee. Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 727(h) (1987). Prior to 1985, an investigating
or interrogating officer was not defined by the statute. This definition was added as
an emergency measure, passed by a three-fifths vote in each house, and taking effect
upon the Governor's signature. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 249, 1985 Mo. LAWS
2019, 2021.
Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 728(b)(3), (4), (5)(iii).
/d. § 728(b)(5)(ii), (12).
/d. § 728(b)(3), (5)(i), (9), (10), (14).
/d. § 728(b)(1), (2), (3), (6), (7)(i), (8), (10), (14).
/d. § 728(b)(7)(ii).
/d. § 728(b)(5)(iv), (b)(8).
/d. § 728(b)(4).
/d. § 728(b)(11).
"The law enforcement officer under interrogation may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action." /d. § 728(b)(7)(i).
Subsection 728(c) provides:
Effect of subtitle on chief's authority. - This subtitle does not limit the
authority of the chief to regulate the competent and efficient operation and
management of a law enforcement agency by any reasonable means including but not limited to, transfer and reassignment where that action is
not punitive in nature and where the chief determines that action to be in
the best interests of the internal management of the law enforcement
agency.
/d. § 728(c).
Subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) provides:
This subtitle does not prevent any law enforcement agency from requiring
a law enforcement officer under investigation to submit to blood alcohol
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out mutual agreement, even in an administrative proceeding. 211
Section 733, also a provision implementing the Gardner holding,
prohibits retaliation in the form of any actual or threatened adverse personnel action in return for exercising or demanding any rights provided
by the LEOBOR, the Maryland Constitution, or the United States Constitution.212 Finally, section 734 provides, upon the denial of any LEOBOR right, for the right to file in the circuit court a request for a show
cause order prior to any hearing here. 213
Two particular aspects of the Maryland LEOBOR are analyzed
tests, blood, breath, or urine tests for controlled dangerous substances,
polygraph examinations, or interrogations which specifically relate to the
subject matter of the investigation. This subtitle does not prevent a law
enforcement agency from commencing any action which may lead to a
punitive measure as a result of a law enforcement officer's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine tests for controlled
dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, after having been ordered to do so by the law enforcement agency. The results of
any blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine test for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, as may be required by the law enforcement agency under this subparagraph are not
admissible or discoverable in any criminal proceedings against the law enforcement officer when the law enforcement officer has been ordered to
submit thereto. The results of a polygraph examination may not be used
as evidence in any administrative hearing when the law enforcement officer has been ordered to submit to a polygraph examination by the law
enforcement agency unless the agency and the law enforcement officer
agree to the admission of the results at the administrative hearing.
/d. § 728(b)(7)(ii). This subsection was added by Act of May 17, 1977, ch. 366,
1977 Mo. LAWS 2128, 2132. Four years later, results were made nondiscoverable,
as well as inadmissible, in any criminal proceeding. Act of May 12, 1981, ch. 456,
1981 Mo. LAWS 1895, 1896. This provision goes further than Garrity by prohibiting the use of blood alcohol tests and blood, breath. or urine tests for controlled
dangerous substances, even though these are not testimonial in nature and therefore
not protected by the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S.
553 (1983).
211. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii).
212. Section 733 provides:
A law enforcement officer may not be discharged, disciplined, demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or otherwise discriminated against in regard to his employment or be threatened with any
such treatment, by reason of his exercise of or demand for the rights
granted in this subtitle, or by reason of the lawful exercise of his constitutional rights.
/d. § 733. Section 733 was included in the original act of 1974. However, as introduced, section 733 only applied to retaliation for the exercise or demand of LEOBOR rights. Constitutional rights were added as an amendment. These
provisions go further than Gardner by prohibiting the creation of a chilling effect
not only on constitutional rights but also on statutory LEOBOR rights that do not
have constitutional stature.
213. Section 734 provides:
Any law enforcement officer who is denied any right afforded by this
subtitle may apply at any time prior to the commencement of the hearing
before the hearing board, either individually or through his certified or
recognized employee organization, to the circuit court of the county where
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here. First, the threshold issue of investigation or interrogation is examined, demonstrating how narrowly the statute has been interpreted
and therefore how easily a court can decide that the protections of the
LEOBOR are inapplicable. Second, the LEOBOR's fifth amendment
Garrity and Gardner provisions are analyzed, using a particular case as
an example of the inadequacy of the statute.
1.

The Threshold to Procedural Safeguards: Investigation or
Interrogation

The fifth amendment protections of Garrity and Gardner are contained in subsection 728{b), which is only applicable "[w]henever a law
enforcement officer is under investigation or subjected to interrogation12141 by a law enforcement agency,l2tsl for any reason which could
lead to disciplinary action, demotion or dismissal .... " 216 Two opinions
of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland demonstrate a result-oriented analysis in holding the LEOBOR inapplicable by finding that the
law enforcement officers were neither under investigation nor subjected
to interrogation. 217

214.

215.
216.
217.

he is regularly employed for any order directing the law enforcement
agency to show cause why the right should not be afforded.
/d. § 734. This section may create confusion because, on first reading, it appears
that statutory rights may be vindicated but not constitutional rights. Not only
would that be an absurdity, it is not what the legislature intended. "This subtitle"
includes constitutional rights because section 733 of the subtitle protects "the lawful
exercise of [the law enforcement officer's] constitutional rights." Sections 733 and
734 are in pari materia and should be read together. Nonetheless, clarity would
prevail if section 734 were amended to "denied any constitutional right or any right
afforded by this subtitle.... "
If the rights at issue are not merely statutory, but are constitutional, section 733,
prohibiting actual or threatened adverse personnel action as a result of exercising or
demanding constitutional or LEOBOR rights, does not require meeting the threshold test of "under investigation" or "subject to interrogation." DiGrazia v. County
Executive, 288 Md. 437, 452, 418 A.2d 1191, 1200 (1980); Montgomery County
Dep't of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md. App. 557, 565, 444 A.2d 469, 473, cert. denied,
294 Md. 142 (1982).
The law enforcement agency may be the officer's agency or another agency. Mayor
& Comm'rs v. Duckworth, 49 Md. App. 236, 243, 431 A.2d 709, 713 (1981).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b). Compare subsection (b) with subsection (c). See
supra note 198.
In addition to the two criticized opinions, there are two opinions that are supportable. In Montgomery County Dep't of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md. App. 557, 444
A.2d 469 (1982), a management report indicated that traffic squads accounted for
9.7% of deployable manpower but accounted for only 3.03% of the work load.
Consequently, traffic squads were disbanded and their personnel reassigned on a
productivity basis, enabling the department to cut back to a five-day week, which
eliminated a five percent pay differential for the reassigned officers. The court of
special appeals held that these transfers were not punitive within the meaning of the
LEOBOR.
In Chief, Baltimore County Police Dep't v. Marchsteiner, 55 Md. App. 108,
461 A.2d 28 (1983), an officer was reassigned to the Police Athletic League in the
hope that a reassignment would reSult in a change of attitude and performance. A
report following complaints of foul and abusive language toward juveniles stated:
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In Widomski v. Chief of Police, 218 the internal affairs division (lAD)
of the Baltimore County Police twice interviewed an officer in connection
with illegal police conduct. The suspected officer subsequently submitted
to a polygraph examination conducted by a lieutenant to determine if the
officer knew anything that had not yet been disclosed. When the lieutenant's suspicion as to the officer's truthfulness became aroused, the lieutenant asked a series of follow-up questions. The polygraph results
indicated that the officer had not been truthful in his response to four
questions. The court found the LEOBOR inapplicable to the polygraph
test results, ruling that the inquiry had not moved from the inquisitorial
stage to the investigatory and accusatorial stage until the lieutenant decided that the suspected officer had not been completely truthful in his
answers.
In Leibe v. Police Department, 219 the inspectional services division
(lSD) made inquiries arising from departmental suspicion that an officer
had abused his sick leave allowance. The officer had been reprimanded
twice for excessive use of sick leave by his shift commander and the officer's sick leave performance had been evaluated as "unsatisfactory."
Although the shift commander did not believe that the officer could be
convicted of a departmental violation, he informed the police chief that
the officer should be reviewed for demotion. A month later, the police
chief rescinded the officer's most recent promotion, primarily because of
his excessive use of sick leave.
The trial court found that the protections of the LEOBOR were inapplicable, holding that the demotion was supervisory and administrative
rather than investigatory and punitive in nature. According to the trial
court, "[t]he demotion was not punishment for any wrongdoing nor the
result of a disciplinary type complaint and investigation. The demotion
was an exercise of the Chief's power and responsibility to effectively and
efficiently operate the law enforcement agency." 220 The court of special
appeals agreed. The court stated that Webster's Dictionary defines inves"The philosophy of the Youth Division, as a Crime Prevention modality, is to build
a positive image of the police officer in the eyes of young people. . . . Det. Marchsteiner's actions are the antithesis of this stated philosophy and are counterproductive of the goals .... " /d. at 111, 461 A.2d at 30. He was involuntarily reassigned
to the Patrol Bureau. The court found that this transfer was not punitive and was
within the best interests of the law enforcement agency. Recognizing that the facts
presented a closer question in Marchsteiner than in Lumpkin, the court stated:
It is probably not feasible to fashion a simple litmus test for determining whether any given personnel action of a law-enforcement agency falls
within the punitive category. The law in this area must be developed on a
case-by-case basis, ... [b]ut on the facts of this case, it appears to us that
the ultimate decision was not punitive in nature. It was an effort to place
Marchsteiner where his abilities could be used for the benefit of the law
enforcement agency, rather than to its detriment.
Marchsteiner, 55 Md. App. at 117, 461 A.2d at 33.
218. 41 Md. App. 361, 397 A.2d 222, cert. denied, 284 Md. 750 (1979).
219. 57 Md. App. 317, 469 A.2d 1287 (1984).
220. /d. at 320, 469 A.2d at 1288.
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tigation as " 'a detailed examination; a searching inquiry; to observe or
study closely,' " 221 and the court concluded that it would take more than
these facts to constitute an investigation and thus trigger the protections
of the LEOBOR. The court stated:
While we will not here attempt to delineate precisely what actions will involve detailed examinations or searching inquiries,
it is clear that the tracking of Leibe's use of sick leave was not
an investigation.
The cases demonstrate that something more than counseling sessions, but perhaps less than formal complaints leading to
inquiry, is necessary to trigger the LEOB[O]R. Nevertheless,
examination of sick leave records and even comparing them
with another employee's is not an investigation as that word is
normally and ordinarily used. 22 2
Subsection 728(b) is triggered when an officer is either "under investigation" or "subjected to interrogation" for something that "could lead
to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal." 223 The definition of "investigation" quoted by the court of special appeals is underinclusive because Webster's Dictionary also defines investigation as a "survey" or an
"official probe" or an "inquiry." 224 According to Black's Law Dictionary, investigate means "[t]o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation[; t]o trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry." 22 S
In Widomski, the inquiry was conducted by the lAD, the internal,
investigatory arm of the police department. lAD members questioned
the suspected officer twice. Five months after the first inquiry, a captain
ordered the officer under suspicion to take a polygraph examination. 226
Even assuming that these facts do not compel a finding that the officer
was "under investigation" within the meaning of the LEOBOR, he was
"subjected to interrogation" within the meaning of the LEOBOR. Interrogation, in the context of the fifth amendment, was defined by the
/d. at 323, 469 A.2d at 1290.
/d. (citation omitted).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b).
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1189 (1976).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., People v. Orr, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 849, 860, 103 Cal. Rptr. 266, 272 (1972) ("investigation is the process by
which the police acquire probable cause"); Meunier v. Bemich, 170 So. 567, 572
(La. App. 1936) ("we understand investigation to be synonymous with detection");
Mason v. Peaslee, 173 Cal. App. 2d 587, 592 n.2, 343 P.2d 805, 808 n.2 (1959)
(" 'investigation' means the process of inquiring into or tracing down through inquiry"); People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 113 Cal. App. 2d 578, 582, 248 P.2d
786, 789 (1952) ("investigation [is] a patient inquiry into, and examination of all
reasonably available facts").
226. Widomski, 41 Md. App. at 363, 397 A.2d at 224.

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Supreme Court in Rhode Island v. Innis, 227 to include not only express
questioning, but also any words or actions that the police "should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."228 Even if two lAD officers asking questions and a lieutenant connecting a polygraph device to the officer's body, followed by questions, is
not "express questioning," it certainly comes within the functional
equivalent as defined in Innis. Subsection 728(b) further requires the
kind of investigation or interrogation that "could lead to disciplinary action, demotion, or dismissal." 229 In Widomski, the lAD was investigating criminal conduct. All illegal conduct constitutes the departmental
violation of conduct unbecoming an officer. 230 The court thus erred in
holding that the investigation and interrogation of Widomski did not
trigger the protections of the LEOBOR.
In Leibe, the court similarly erred. The suspected officer was investigated for sick leave abuse for six months by the lSD. He was reprimanded twice, received an "unsatisfactory" performance evaluation, and
even had a promotion rescinded. 231 The shift commander's belief that
the officer could not be convicted of a departmental violation is both incorrect and irrelevant. The trial court's determination that "[t]he demotion was not punishment for any wrongdoing [but merely the] exercise of
the Chief's power and responsibility to effectively and efficiently operate
the law enforcement agency" 232 is absurd. Fraudulently depriving an
employer of work time is chargeable both departmentally 233 and
criminally. 234
2.

The Garrity and Gardner Fifth Amendment Provisions

Holloway v. State, 235 a pre-LEOBOR case, is the only case in which
the Maryland courts have addressed the Garrity and Gardner issue. In
Holloway, a police officer was convicted of possession of heroin allegedly
stolen from the police property room. The officer gave two oral statements and one written statement on three consecutive days, all of which
were admitted at trial. In his first statement, he denied having ever been
in possession of the heroin. In the second and third statements, he ad227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

235.

446 u.s. 291 (1980).
/d. at 301 (footnotes omitted).
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b).
See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
The fact that this probably was discovered pursuant to an audit of personnel records
does not make it any less of an investigation. See Mondovi Coop. Equity Ass'n v.
State, 258 Wis. 505, 46 N.W.2d 825 (1951).
Leibe, 57 Md. App. at 320, 469 A.2d at 1288.
See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
In addition to the common law misdemeanor of misconduct in office, see supra notes
12-14 and accompanying text, this conduct constitutes theft by deception. Mo.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 342(b) (1987). If the income for the time fraudulently not
worked was $300 or more, the offense is a felony subject to 1S years imprisonment.
/d. § 342(f)(1); see also id. § 340(/)(S).
26 Md. App. 382, 339 A.2d 319, cert. denied, 276 Md. 745 (1975).

502

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol.16

mitted signing for the heroin but claimed that he merely took the bags to
his automobile, counted them, and returned them. Although none of the
statements standing alone was inculpatory, the three combined created a
significant issue concerning the officer's credibility. A departmental policy then in effect provided that the refusal to make a statement to a superior officer, when an officer is ordered to do so, could result in
disciplinary action, including termination. The court reversed the conviction, finding that the departmental policy made the statements involuntary as a matter of law under Garrity.
The statutory language used to implement the Garrity and Gardner
fifth amendment holdings is found in subsection 728(b)(7) and section
733. Subsection 728(b)(7)(ii), which adopts the Garrity holding, provides
in part:
The results of any blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine
test for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, as may be required by the law enforcement agency under this subparagraph are not admissible or
discoverable in any criminal proceedings against the law enforcement officer when the law enforcement officer has been ordered to submit thereto.236
Subsection 728(b)(7)(i) and section 733 both implement the Gardner
holding. The former provides that "[t]he law enforcement officer under
interrogation may not be threatened with transfer, dismissal, or disciplinary action. " 237 The latter provides that:
A law enforcement officer may not be discharged, disciplined,
demoted, or denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment, or
otherwise discriminated against in regard to his employment or
be threatened with any such treatment, by reason of his exercise
of or demand for the rights granted in this subtitle, or by reason
of the lawful exercise of his constitutional rights. 238
a.

The Immunity Requirement

The legislature's attempt to implement the dicta of Gardner, Sanitation Men, and Turley is contained in the first two sentences of subsection
728(b)(7)(ii), which provides that:
This subtitle does not prevent any law enforcement agency
from requiring a law enforcement officer under investigation to
submit to blood alcohol tests, blood, breath, or urine tests for
controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examinations, or
interrogations which specifically relate to the subject matter of
the investigation. This subtitle does not prevent a law enforce236. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 728(b)(7)(ii).
237. /d. § 728(b)(7)(i).
238. /d. § 733.
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ment agency from commencing any action which may lead to a
punitive measure as a result of a law enforcement officer's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, blood, breath, or urine
tests for controlled dangerous substances, polygraph examination, or interrogation, after having been ordered to do so by the
law enforcement agency. 239
The fundamental problem with the LEOBOR is that it fails to incorporate the immunity requirement of Gardner, Sanitation Men, and
Turley. Only when immunity is granted may a law enforcement agency
require an officer to provide a statement and then take disciplinary action
for the officer's failure to do so. The shortcoming of the Maryland statute is twofold. First, the statute does not provide the constitutionally
mandated "use and derivative use" immunity. Consequently, any statements taken under the statute's more limited protection are unconstitutionally involuntary under Garrity, and any actual or threatened adverse
personnel action has a chilling effect on fifth amendment rights under
Gardner. Second, even if the statute does provide a constitutionally acceptable fifth amendment substitute, it does not provide that the law enforcement officer be informed that his statements will be inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding. As far as the officer knows, he or she is still faced
with the impermissible Hobson's choice.
In Maryland, there is no inherent or common law power to grant
immunity. Such power exists only if the legislature or the state constitution expressly authorizes a grant of immunity. 240 Maryland has only a
few immunity statutes, each limited to a particular offense that the legislature has determined is difficult to investigate and prosecute without the
testimony of participants in the criminal activity. 241 Maryland's lack of a
general immunity statute is not due to legislative oversight. Since 1978,
the Maryland General Assembly has considered but rejected at least five
general immunity bills.242
There are three kinds of immunity: (1) transactional immunity, (2)
use immunity, and (3) use plus derivative use immunity. "Transactional
immunity" prohibits the prosecution of all criminal transactions about
which the individual is compelled to testify. Almost all of Maryland's
limited number of immunity statutes provide transactional immunity. 243
Mere "use immunity," at the other extreme, merely guarantees that the
compelled testimony itself will not be used in court as evidence against
the compelled witness. Use immunity is constitutionally defective to
239. Id. § 728(b)(7)(ii).
240. Butler v. State, 55 Md. App. 409, 418, 462 A.2d 1230, 1234 (1983); Bowie v. State,
14 Md. App. 567, 575, 287 A.2d 782, 786 (1972).
241. In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 516 A.2d 976,983 (1986); e.g.,
Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 23-24 (1987) (bribery); id. § 39 (conspiracy); id. § 262
(gambling); id. § 371 (lottery).
242. In re Criminal Investigation, 307 Md. at 685 n.5, 516 A.2d at 982 n.5.
243. Butler, 55 Md. App. at 420, 462 A.2d at 1235.
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compel testimony in the face of an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. "Use plus derivative use immunity" is the minimum needed to satisfy the fifth amendment because it
provides as much as it takes away. 244 Use plus derivative use immunity
guarantees the compelled witness not only that his words will not be used
against him directly but also that they will not be used indirectly as leads
to develop other evidence. 245 Once a prosecutor gives a constitutional
grant of immunity, pursuant to an express immunity statute, "his only
guarantees of adequate testimonial performance are the threat of contempt and the threat of perjury." 246
There is nothing in subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) to permit reading it as an
express grant of immunity by the legislature. If the legislature did provide the power to grant immunity, it would be Maryland's first general
immunity statute, that is, the State's first immunity statute to apply to
more than one specific crime. 247 It also would be unconstitutional because it neither immunizes from prosecution for any transaction for
which testimony is compelled nor protects against both the use of the
statements as evidence and the use of the statements as leads to develop
other evidence. From this standpoint, subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) is merely
an exclusionary device rendering statements inadmissible as evidence.
The sect~on is thus constitutionally insufficient to compel testimony from
an individual desiring to exercise the unfettered fifth amendment right to
remain silent without penalty. 2 48
244. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972); In re Criminal Investigation,
307 Md. at 684, 516 A.2d at 982.
245. Butler, 55 Md. App. at 421, 462 A.2d at 1235.
246. /d. at 422, 462 A.2d at 1236.
247. The LEOBOR was designed to provide more rights- not fewer- to law enforcement officers. If police officers are now the only citizens upon whom immunity may
be "forced" for all crimes, they would be receiving fewer rights than the general
citizen because immunity offers no advantage to the one immunized. As the court
stated in Butler v. State:
Formal immunity is not necessarily the subject of a bargain and is frequently forced upon a reluctant witness against that witness's will. A witness is summonsed to testify at a trial or before a grand jury. The witness
claims the privilege against compelled testimonial self-incrimination. The
State, upon explicit statutory authorization, may then officially and upon
the record confer a grant of the appropriate form of immunity upon the
recalcitrant witness, whether that witness wishes it or not.
55 Md. App. at 421, 462 A.2d at 1236. Moreover, if subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) were
an immunity statute, Maryland would have an immunity statute enforceable not
simply by the judicially approved methods of threat of contempt and threat of perjury but by a new threat, that of disciplinary action and loss of employment.
248. This is not changed by the fact that subsection 728(b)(7)(ii) makes the results of any
"interrogation, as may be required by the law enforcement agency ... not admissible or discoverable in any criminal proceedings .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 728(b)(7)(ii) (emphasis added). The fact that it is the law enforcement agency that
required the statement renders meaningless for the officer the 1981 amendment of
"or discoverable." See infra note 298.
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Smith v. Howard County

The problem with the Garrity and Gardner provisions of the Maryland LEOBOR is demonstrated in the case of Smith v. Howard
County. 249 After an officer and his superior were engaged in a dispute,
the superior scheduled a meeting with the officer. The officer requested
to have a witness present during the meeting, but this request was denied.
At the meeting, the officer took out a tape recorder in an unsuccessful
attempt to record the conversation. The department alleged that the officer surreptitiously taped the conversation, which is a felony in Maryland. 250 Inasmuch as the officer's conduct did not violate any
departmental regulation, he was subject to investigation solely by virtue
of the felony criminal statute.
The officer then was notified that he was under investigation and
was ordered to answer questions. He informed his superiors that he
would appear as required but would assert his fifth amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. The department's response was
that he would be subjected only to departmental disciplinary action, that
he would not be subjected to criminal charges, that any answers he was
forced to provide would be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding
against him pursuant to the LEOBOR, and that his failure to answer
questions could result in the commencement of an action leading to punitive measures, including dismissal. 251 Nonetheless, the police depart249. No. 87-CA5262 (Cir. Ct. Howard County, Md., Mar. 2, 1987). The author served
as co-counsel on behalf of Officer Smith, along with Clarke F. Ahlers, Esq., an adjunct professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a former Howard
County police officer.
250. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 10-402 (Supp. 1987). Subsection (a) prohibits the interception, disclosure, or use of certain wire or oral communication. Subsection (b) establishes that the offense is a felony, subject to five years imprisonment
and a $10,000 fine.
251. The police department relied on Nichols v. Baltimore Police Dep't, 53 Md. App.
623, 455 A.2d 446, cert. denied, 296 Md. 111 (1983), in which the court of special
appeals addressed the limited issue of the meaning of subsection 728(b)(10) of the
LEOBOR, determining the extent to which a police officer and his or her representative may consult in order to enter objections to questions asked by an interrogator.
The court stated that subsection 728(b)(l0) was:
concerned solely with investigations or interrogations involving possible
violations of non-criminal departmental policies. Otherwise, the full panoply of Miranda would be applicable, and subsection 728(b)(10) would be
mere surplusage, since Miranda is founded on the supreme law of the land,
the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, any attempt by State
law to restrict Miranda's application would be futile.
/d. at 628, 455 A.2d at 449. Not only did the Nichols court hold that the lone
subsection at issue addressed only "non-criminal departmental policies," it found
that the complaint against the officer was that he "'shirked ... [his] responsibilities,'" id. at 624, 455 A.2d at 447, and thus the "interrogation is, in appellant's case,
strictly non-criminal." /d. at 629, 455 A.2d at 450. It was in this context that the
court wrote the language upon which the Department relied in Smith v. Howard
County:
The commander may order the officer to answer the question, and if that
order is refused, the officer in all likelihood faces a charge of disobeying
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ment was unwilling to secure, and statutorily was incapable of securing,
immunity for the officer.
The officer obtained a court order enjoining the police department
from taking, or threatening to take, punitive personnel action in return
for the exercise of his fifth amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination or of his rights under the LEOBOR. In granting the injunction, the court rejected the police department's position that the officer's asserted rights were inapplicable because the department planned
to treat the matter as purely noncriminal, departmental, and administrative. According to the court, the department's assertion was not controlling because any individual may refuse "to answer official questions put
to him in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." 252
As long as there is a potential for criminal charges arising from the conduct, the right to remain silent is absolute. Unless there has been a constitutionally sufficient grant of immunity, the person being interrogated
for potentially criminal conduct has the constitutional right to remain
silent. 253
Further complications in the Smith case indicate the extent of the
law enforcement officer's dilemma. First, the LEOBOR could not have
provided the officer with the constitutional protection of immunity necessary to compel his testimony. Even if there were an applicable immunity
statute under which immunity could be granted, it could be implemented
only by the Office of the State's Attorney. Because the officer was
charged departmentally, his adversary was the Howard County Police
Department, represented by the Howard County Office of Law, its attorneys for civil and administrative matters.
Second, although the attorneys for Howard County's civil matters
assured the officer, and proffered to the court, that this matter was and
would remain purely civil, the attorneys for the people of Howard
County in criminal matters, the Office of the State's Attorney, could and
did pursue this matter criminally. The grand jury, however, refused to
return an indictment against the officer.
the commander's direct order. Dismissal from the department is a possible, if not probable, product of the disobedience. In short, the officer, confronted by not answering a question or disobeying a direct order of his or
her commander, is placed in the position of choosing between facing a
tiger or facing a lion. Either choice might prove fatal to the officer's career
in law-enforcement.
Id. at 628-29, 455 A.2d at 449-50. If the sole purpose of an investigation is an
accounting of job performance, with no potential criminality because of immunity,
then an order to answer questions, under threat of loss of employment, is constitutionally permissible.
252. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (emphasis added); see Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (includes administrative and investigatory
proceedings); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 683, 516 A.2d
976, 981 (1986).
253. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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Third, even if the alleged conduct for which the officer was being
disciplined did not violate a specific criminal statute, this would not automatically preclude the officer from asserting his privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The criminal law of Maryland includes the
common law254 misdemeanor of misconduct in office, 255 which includes
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance by a public officer while in
the exercise of the duties of office or while acting under color of law.
Although not all conduct unbecoming an officer or all neglect of duty
constitutes misconduct in office, the crime of misconduct in office is
broad, particularly in its nonfeasance mode, in which any failure to act,
when resulting from corruption rather than discretion, may constitute
misconduct. As to the affirmative conduct of malfeasance or misfeasance/56 "[t]his does not mean a mere error of judgment, but rather a
wilful abuse of authority, or a grossly indecorous conduct during the performance of his duties.... "257
Fourth, this case demonstrates that police departments, as para-military organizations, have a tendency to abuse the constitutional rights of
their officers. In Smith, after the officer obtained an injunction to enforce
his constitutional rights, the department decided to punish him by seeking an indictment, which the grand jury refused to return. One year
later, the administrative charge was refiled. A settlement was negotiated
in which the department agreed to drop all charges and the officer agreed
to accept a letter of "poor judgment." The next day, the officer was instructed to sign papers related to the settlement and was incorrectly told
that his attorney had reviewed them. In fact, the officer was signing a
confession. The present degree of regulation allows police departments
to continue to chill the fifth amendment rights of officers through a myriad of punitive measures used in retailiation for the exercise of constitutional guarantees. By failing to regulate departmental treatment of police
officers, courts and legislatures have unintentionally encouraged this
tendency.
C. Statutory Protections in Other States .
1. California
In 1976, California enacted the Public Safety Officers Procedural
Bill of Rights Act. 258 Section 3303 of the Act, which is somewhat analogous to section 728 of the Maryland statute, provides procedural safe254. Maryland adopted all of the common law of England as it existed on July 4, 1776,
subject to change by the Maryland General Assembly. Mo. CONST., DECL. RIGHTS
art. 5. See supra note 37.
255. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
256. "[S]ince the reference is not to two different offenses, but merely to two different
modes of committing the offenses, the courts have had little occasion to indulge in
hairsplitting discussions of the problem. PERKINS, supra note 10, at 545.
257. GINSBERG, supra note 14, at 152.
258. Act of Aug. 16, 1976, ch. 465, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1202 (codified as amended at CAL.
Gov'T CODE§§ 3300-11 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988)).
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guards for public safety oflicers259 during interrogation and
investigation. 260 These protections include guaranteed investigation-related rights,2 61 as well as rights prior to, 262 during, 2 6 3 and as a conse259. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1983) (a police department clerk-stenographer was subject to departmental regulations and thus could be terminated for insubordination; she was not, however, afforded the protections of the statute because the statute applies only to peace
officers).
260. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303. The nine subsections of section 3303 are triggered
whenever there is investigation and interrogation by a member of the officer's
agency. People v. Velez, 144 Cal. App. 3d 558, 192 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1983) (section
3303 is not applicable when interrogated by another department). Moreover, section 3303 is limited to situations that could lead to punitive action, defined as "any
action which may lead to dismissal, demotion, suspension, reduction in salary, written reprimand, or transfer for purposes of punishment." CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3303.
Unlike transfers, which may be punishment or may be advantageous to the officer,
dismissal and the other four categories of personnel action are per se disciplinary
and punitive. White v. Sacramento, 31 Cal. 3d 676, 646 P.2d 191, 183 Cal. Rptr.
520 (1982) (loss of rank and loss of five percent special pay allowance was per se
punitive); McManigal v. Seal Beach, 166 Cal. App. 3d 975, 212 Cal. Rptr. 733
( 1985) (same rank and base salary but loss of five percent skill pay was per se punitive); Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982)
(assignment to lower pay grade was per se disciplinary). Compare Turturici v. City
of Redwood City, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1447, 236 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1987) (a negative
appraisal, with recommendation for discipline if performance did not improve, was
an adverse personnel entry, providing the right to a written response under section
3006, but it was not a punitive action giving rise to an administrative appeal), with
Hopson v. LOs Angeles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 347, 188 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1983) (a commission report of departmental violations resulting from a police shooting, entered in a
personnel file in lieu of disciplinary action because the chief of police had decided
against discipline, was punitive).
261. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3305 (no adverse entry in the officer's personnel file unless the
officer has read and signed (or refused to sign) the adverse instrument); id. § 3306
(officer has 30 days to file a written response to the adverse entry in the personnel
file).
262. /d. § 3303(b) (the right to be informed of the name of the officer in charge of the
interrogation and all persons to be present during the interrogation); id. § 3303(c)
(the right to be informed of the nature of the investigation prior to interrogation);
id. § 3303(f) (the right to examine reports made by the investigating officer as they
become available, including those already in existence prior to interrogation, except
those pertaining to an ongoing investigation for which confidentiality has been supported by articulable reasons; see Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v.
Los Angeles, 236 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. App. 1987)); id. § 3303(g) (the right to be
informed of constitutional rights prior to interrogation if, at that time, deemed
chargeable in a criminal proceeding).
263. /d. § 3303(a) (interrogation conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while on
duty); id. § 3303(b) (interrogated by no more than two officers at a time); id.
§ 3303(d) (interrogation session to last only for a reasonable period of time); id.
§ 3303(f) (officer entitled to record the interrogation); id. § 3303(g) (informed of
constitutional rights during interrogation if, at that time, the officer is deemed
chargeable in a criminal proceeding); id. § 3303(h) (right to a chosen representative
present at all times during the interrogation if punitive action is likely).
In Lybarger v. Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. 727, 732-33 (Cal. App. 1984), rev'd
on other grounds, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985), there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of interrogation by no more than two
officers. Although five officers were present, only two officers conducted the interrogation and a third officer merely asked questions to clarify whether the defendant
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quence of interrogation. 264 The statute on its face is inapplicable in
certain situations in which its protections may be needed. Section 3303
does not apply "to any interrogation ... in the normal course of duty,
counseling, instruction, or informal verbal admonishment." Nor does it
apply "to an investigation concerned solely and directly with alleged
criminal activities. " 265
Although the goal of the legislation is laudable, 266 the California
statute is less effectice than its Maryland counterpart in implementing
the dictates of the Supreme Court. Much of the judicial misunderstanding surrounding the Garrity holding, the Gardner holding, and the immunity requirement is manifested in the California statute. The
constitutional standards set forth in the cases are addressed by overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, statutory language. For example,
subsection 3304(a) and subsection 3303(e) each begin with the Gardner
holding: the former prohibits actual or threatened adverse personnel action in connection with the exercise of any of the protections afforded by
the statute, 267 and the latter prohibits threatened adverse personnel action during interrogation. 268 However, despite the fact that no immunity
is provided, both sections nullify the Gardner holding by authorizing punitive personnel action in return for asserting the fifth amendment privilege. Subsection 3304(a) permits a charge of insubordination against any
officer who fails to comply with an order to cooperate with agencies involved in criminal investigations. 269 Subsection 3303(e) provides that an
officer may be punished for the failure to answer questions directly relating to the investigation or interrogation. 270
As to the polygraph method of submitting to interrogation, the California statute is more generous than the statutes in the other three states.

264.
265.
266.
267.

268.
269.

270.

appreciated the severity of the potential consequences. Cf Long Beach Police Officers Ass'n v. Long Beach, 156 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1010-11, 203 Cal. Rptr. 494, 50305 (1984) (officer entitled to have a representative present prior to filing a written
report required for shooting incidents).
/d. § 3303(f) (access to a tape recording of the interrogation, if made); id. (officer
entitled to a copy of the stenographer's transcribed notes and any non-confidential
report made by the investigating officer).
/d. § 3303(h).
"The Legislature . . . declares that the rights and protections provided to peace
officers under this chapter constitutes a matter of statewide concern." /d. § 3301.
"No public safety officer shall be subjected to punitive action, or denied promotion,
or be threatened with any such treatment, because of the lawful exercise of the
rights granted under this chapter, or the exercise of any rights under any existing
administrative grievance procedure." /d. § 3304(a).
"The public safety officer under interrogation shall not be subjected to offensive
language or threatened with punitive action .... " /d. § 3303(e).
"Nothing in this section shall preclude a head of an agency from ordering a public
safety officer to cooperate with other agencies involved in criminal investigations. If
an officer fails to comply with such an order, the agency may officially charge him
with insubordination." /d. § 3304(a).
"[A)n officer refusing to respond to questions or submit to interrogations shall be
informed that failure to answer questions directly related to the investigation or
interrogation may result in punitive action." /d. § 3303(e).
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It prohibits nonconsensual polygraph examinations, prohibits disciplinary action for refusal to submit to a polygraph examination, and prohibits any adverse inference to be drawn from the refusal to submit. 271
Like the Maryland law, the California statute, in section 3309.5,
prohibits the denial of any statutory protection and provides for injunctive relief in the superior court in the event of such a denial. 272 Additionally, section 3309.5 provides for "other extraordinary relief to remedy the
violation," 273 which can include a writ of mandate to compel back
pay. 274 Moreover, courts have awarded attorney's fees under the private
attorney general theory, holding that the public policy enforced through
this statute is sufficient to permit compensating the cost of privately initiated actions. 275
Only recently have the California courts provided the judicial gloss
necessary to overcome the California legislature's confusion concerning
the Supreme Court's fifth amendment case law. In Lybarger v. City of Los
Angeles, 276 the Supreme Court of California implicitly recognized that
the statute is unnecessarily complex and that its treatment by the appellate courts had been artifically strained, sometimes for and sometimes
against the officer. With a clear understanding of the problem, the court
indicated that the statute is, or should be, the synthesis of the Supreme
Court cases, supplemented by statutory protections. The court stated:

We must construe the act in such a manner as to encourage full cooperation with police department investigations
of criminal offenses, so long as fundamental constitutional
rights are protected in the process. Such a balancing of interests is achieved by holding that, although the officer under investigation is not compelled to respond to potentially
271. Nonconsensual polygraph examinations are controlled as follows:
No public safety officer shall be compelled to submit to a polygraph examination against his will. No disciplinary action or other recrimination shall
be taken against a public safety officer refusing to submit to a polygraph
examination, nor shall any comment be entered anywhere in the investigator's notes or anywhere else that the public safety officer refused to take a
polygraph examination, nor shall any testimony or evidence be admissible
at a subsequent hearing, trial, or proceeding, judicial or administrative, to
the effect that the public safety officer refused to take a polygraph
examination.
/d.§ 3307; see Estes v. Grover City, 82 Cal. App. 3d 509, 516, 147 Cal. Rptr. 131,
135-36 (1978); see also Long Beach City Employees Ass'n v. Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d
937, 719 P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
272. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 3309.5.
273. /d.
274. Henneberque v. Culver City, 172 Cal. App. 3d 837, 843, 218 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706
(1985).
275. See, e.g., Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 649 P.2d 874, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1982);
Mounger v. Gates, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1248, 239 Cal. Rptr. 18, modified, 194 Cal.
App. 3d 500 (1987); Henneberque, 172 Cal. App. 3d at 845-47, 218 Cal. Rptr. at
709-10 (1985); CAL CIV. PROC. CODE§ 1021.5 (West 1980).
276. 40 Cal. 3d 822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985).
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incriminating questions, and his refusal to speak cannot be used
against him in a criminal proceeding, nevertheless such refusal
may be deemed insubordination leading to punitive action by
his employer. Seen in this light, the right to remain silent is not
a "hollow" right. It may be exercised without fear of penal
sanction. 277
Taking the middle ground position on the immunity requirement,
the court held that the officer's dismissal for insubordination for assertion
of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was invalid for two
reasons. First, the officer was not advised, as required by the fifth
amendment, that any statements he made could not be used against him
in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Second, he was not advised, as
required by subsection 3303(g) of the statute, of his constitutional rights
once "it was deemed that he may be charged with a criminal offense
•••• " 278 The court recognized that the question of when an officer may
be charged with a criminal offense is a factual issue involving the objective facts of the investigation and the subjective understanding of the interrogating officer. 279 As to which constitutional rights an officer is
entitled to be informed as a result of subsection 3303(g), the court again
demonstrated its understanding of the holdings and dicta of Garrity and
its progeny, balancing contitutional protections and the need for departmental discipline. The court stated:
Given the context of an administrative inquiry into possible
criminal misconduct, we think it likely the Legislature intended
that interrogated officers be advised of their so-called "Miranda
rights, as modified by the Lefkowitz/Garrity rule . . . .
[A]ppellant should have been told, among other things, that
although he had the right to remain silent and not incriminate
himself, (1) his silence could be deemed insubordination, leading to administrative discipline, and (2) any statement made
under the compulsion of the threat of such discipline could not
be used against him in any subsequent criminal proceeding.
Although appellant was properly advised of the adverse effect
of his silence, he was never told of the extent of the protection
afforded to any statements he might make. That omission was
critically important here. 280
277. /d. at 828, 710 P.2d at 332, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 532 (emphasis in original).
278. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303(g).
279. Lybarger, 40 Cal. 3d at 829 n.1, 710 P.2d at 333 n.1, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533 n.l. In
Lybarger, a criminal investigation was pending, five investigating officers were present during the interrogation, and the officer's attorney made an unchallenged statement, in the presence of the investigating officers, that he was being charged with
five felonies. /d. at 829, 710 P.2d at 333, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533. The court also
stated that this subsection is necessarily triggered by an assertion of the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. /d. at 828, 710 P.2d at 332, 221 Cal. Rptr. at
532.
280. /d. at 829, 710 P.2d at 333, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 533 (citations omitted); accord Civil
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Chief Justice Bird, writing in concurrence, agreed with the middle
ground position requiring the officer be advised of the immunity. "The
logic underlying Gardner is that an officer under investigation is not required to speculate as to what his constitutional rights are." 281
2.

Florida
In 1974, Florida enacted the Police Offficers' Bill of Rights, 282

Serv. Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Cal. App. 3d 449, 460, 188 Cal. Rptr. 806,
814 (1983) ("before being ordered to take a polygraph, an employee must be notified: (1) that the questions will relate specificaJly and narrowly to the performance
of his official duties; (2) that the answers cannot be used against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution; and (3) that the penalty for refusing is dismissal").
281. Lybarger, 40 Cal. 3d at 834, 710 P.2d at 336, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 536 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring). Lybarger resolved the problem created by two opinions, issued a
month apart, from different districts of the California Court of Appeal. In KeJly v.
City of Fresno, 205 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), the court addressed the
meaning of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303(g), which requires an officer to be informed
immediately of his constitutional rights once it is deemed that he may be charged in
a criminal proceeding. The court held that this requires Miranda warnings and also
held that subsection 3303(g) is in pari materia with subsection 3304(a), which prohibits actual or threatened punitive action because of the exercise of any statutory
right provided in the act. 205 Cal. Rptr. at 420. As a result, once subsection
3303(g) is applicable, the officer enjoys the right to remain silent in both a civil and
criminal context. Employing the self-executing immunity theory, the court noted
that the fifth amendment precludes the use in a criminal proceeding of any answer
provided under threat of loss of employment. The court also held that any answer
provided under threat of adverse personnel action could not be used in a civil administrative proceeding. /d. at 424. Thus, although the fifth amendment would
permit discharge for insubordination for assertion of the right to remain silent, provided the officer has been granted immunity, the California statute goes further,
forbidding such a discharge. In light of its holding in Lybarger, the Supreme Court
of California remanded Kelly for reconsideration. 41 Cal. 3d 919, 719 P.2d 242,226
Cal. Rptr. 868 (1986).
Taking an entirely different stance was the intermediate appeJlate court in
Lybarger, 206 Cal. Rptr. 727 (Cal. App. 1984). Distinguishing Kelly, the court
found that the officer suffered no harm from the failure to give Miranda warnings
under subsection 3303(g) because the officer knew he had these rights and in fact
invoked them. Rejecting Kelly's expansive reading, Lybarger reverted to 1939,
quoting heavily from Christal v. Police Comm'r, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416
(1939), to the effect that a police officer must disclose aJI evidence of criminality
even if it means incriminating himself. Lybarger, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 736. Moreover,
the Lybarger court noted that although the statute prohibits punitive action for exercising statutory rights and provides the right to be advised of constitutional rights,
it does not prohibit punitive action for exercising constitutional rights, with the exception of forbidding punishment" for a refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. /d. at 736-37. In affirming the officer's dismissal for insubordination for
asserting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the court stated that
California has long recognized that a public servant must be willing to forego constitutional privileges inconsistent with the duties of office. /d. at 737.
282. Act of Oct. 1, 1974, ch. 74-274, 1974 FLA. LAWS 728 (codified as amended at FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 112.531-34 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987)).
The 1974 statute applied only to those law enforcement officers who were "employed full time by any municipality or this state or any political subdivision thereof
.... " /d.§ 112.531(1). Because the office of sheriff is constitutional, deputy sheriffs
are appointed (not employed) by a sheriff (not a municipality, state, or political
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which includes procedural safeguards during interrogation and investigation.283 These protections include rights guaranteed during 284 and subsequent to investigation; 285 rights prior to286 and during interrogation; 287

283.

284.

285.
286.
287.

subdivision) and thus are not within the protections of the statute. Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503, 508 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Evans v. Hardcastle, 339 So. 2d 1150,
1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Johnson v. Wilson, 336 So. 2d. 651, 652 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976).
Probationary police officers are not employed full time within the meaning of
the statute. In Smith v. Golden Beach, 403 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981),
the court reasoned that "[i]n light of the past practice of excluding probationary
policemen from procedural rights accorded permanent employees, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended to include probationers within the statute .... "
/d. at 1347-48. "Employed full time" requires an officer to be available for full
employment. Consequently, regardless of the number and length of days he
worked, a patrolman was not employed full time when he also worked a 40-hour
week as a hospital security guard. Thomason v. McDaniel, 793 F.2d 1247, 1249
(11th Cir. 1986).
A law enforcement officer is one, other than a chief of pQlice, ".whose primary
responsibility is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the
penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.531(1). This
definition excludes a community service officer who has no general arrest powers, is
not authorized to carry weapons, does not enforce the law, and does not respond to
emergency calls. Hollywood v. Litteral, 446 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) (of 12 task areas, two related tangentially to crime prevention or detection,
three related to enforcement of traffic laws, and seven had no connection with law
enforcement).
In 1982, correctional officers were added to the statute. Act of Oct. 1, 1982, ch.
82-156, 1982 FLA. LAws 490. A correctional officer is one, other than a superintendent, "whose primary responsibility is the supervision, protection, care, custody, or
control of inmates within a correctional institution ... " but excludes secretarial,
clerical, and professionally trained personnel. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.531(2).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.532. Section 112.532 is only applicable when "a law enforcement officer or correctional officer is under investigation and subject to interrogation by members of his agency for any reason which could lead to disciplinary
action, demotion, or dismissal .... " /d. § 112.532(1). In Waters v. Purdy, 345 So.
2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), the court found the statute inapplicable because
the officer "was not under investigation, but rather was terminated for violation of
the public safety department's personnel rules which he admitted violating."
/d. § 112.532(1)(c) (the right to be informed of the name of the officer in charge of
the interrogation); id. § 112.532(1)(d) (the right to be informed of the name of all
complainants); id. § 112.532(1)(h) (the right to be informed of all rights if arrested
or likely to be arrested); id. § 112.533(3) (it is a misdemeanor to disclose any documents or information related to a complaint prior to its public status).
/d. § 112.532(4) (no adverse personnel action unless notified prior to its effective
date); id § 112.533(2)(b) (investigation presumed inactive if there is no finding made
within 60 days after the complaint is filed).
/d. § 112.532(1)(c) (the right to be informed of the name of the interrogating officer
and all persons who will be present during the interrogation); id. § 112.532(1)(d)
(the right to be informed of the nature of the investigation).
/d. § 112.532(1)(a) (interrogation conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while
on duty); id. § 112.532(1)(b) (interrogation conducted at the office of the investigating officer or police unit where the incident allegedly occurred); id. § 112.532(1)(c)
(questions asked by one interrogator at a time); id. § 112.532(1)(e) (interrogation to
continue for only a reasonable period of time); id. § 112.532(1)(f) (no offensive language, threats of adverse personnel action, or inducements during interrogation); id.
§ 112.532(1)(g) (interrogation recorded); id. § 112.532(1)(i) (the right to have counsel or other representative present at all times during interrogation).
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and the right to file suit. 288 The only Supreme Court doctrine echoed in
the statute is the Gardner holding, prohibiting actual or threatened adverse personnel action in response to the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the statute. 289 Like the Maryland LEOBOR, the Florida statute provides injunctive relief in the circuit court for officers injured by a denial
of any right guaranteed by the statute. 2 9o
3.

Virginia

In 1978, Virginia enacted its Law-Enforcement Officers' Procedural
Guarantees. 291 Compared to the Maryland LEOBOR, the Virginia statute provides only a few protections, including certain rights guaranteed
during investigation, 292 rights prior to 293 and during interrogation, 294
and rights prior to 295 and during hearings. 296 To the extent that .there is
288. /d. § 112.532(3) (right to sue any individual or group for pecuniary and other damages suffered during the performance of official duties or for abridgement of civil
rights arising out of the performance of official duties). The statute provides no
right to sue for defamation greater than the rights the officer has as a citizen. Mesa
v. Rodriquez, 357 So. 2d 711, 712-13 (Fla. 1978). As a citizen, the officer is foreclosed from bringing an action in defamation against any individual who files a
complaint with the police department, because the public has an absolute constitutional right for redress of grievances and has absolute immunity when filing a grievance in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Gray v. Rodriquez, 481 So. 2d 1298
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). This provision may not be used to file suit for back pay.
Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F. Supp. 28, 38 (M.D. Fla. 1976). Cf Bembanaste v.
Hollywood, 394 So. 2d 1054, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (summary final judgment affirmed for defendant municipality in suit for reinstatement, back pay, costs,
and attorney's fees because officer's complaint failed to allege that termination resulted from an attempt to exercise any right provided by the statute).
289. /d. § 112.532(5). "No law enforcement officer shall be discharged; disciplined; demoted; denied promotion, transfer, or reassignment; or otherwise discriminated
against in regard to his employment, or be threatened with any such treatment, by
reason of his exercise of the rights granted by this part." /d. In Sylvester v. Delray
Beach, 431 So. 2d. 738 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (per curiam), a complaint alleging
a threatened denial of promotion, transfer, and reassignment for exercising statutory
rights and for refusing to abandon litigation created a ·genuine issue of fact sufficient
to defeat the defendant's summary judgment motion.
290. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.534. Section 112.534 provides injunctive relief by restraining violations of police officer rights contained in sections 112.531 through
.533. It does not, however, provide injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement.
Migliore v. Lauderhill, 415 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 431 So.
2d 986 (Fla. 1983).
291. Act of Mar. 3, 1978, ch. 19, 1978 VA. LAWS 31 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.1-.1 to .9 (1987)).
292. /d.§ 2.1-116.2.2. (informed of nature of investigation and name and rank of investigating officer).
293. /d. (informed of individuals to be present during interrogation).
294. /d. § 2.1-116.2.1. (interrogated at a reasonable time and place, preferably while on
duty).
295. /d. § 2.1-116.4. (notified in writing of charges and action that may be taken; provided opportunity to respond to charges orally and in writing with assistance of
counsel); id. § 2.1-116.5. (subpoena witnesses).
296. /d. § 2.1-116.5. (present evidence and cross-examine witnesses through counsel).
Although there is a right to a hearing whenever a law enforcement officer is dismissed, demoted, suspended, or transferred for punitive reasons, such right accrues
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any relation between the law's provisions and the Supreme Court doctrines of Garrity and its progeny, 297 the law violates rather than vindicates those constitutional decisions. With no recognition of the fifth
amendment protections of Garrity and Gardner, and with no reference to
the granting of immunity, the statute provides that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall ... prevent the suspension of a law-enforcement officer for
refusing to obey a direct order issued in conformance with the agency's
written and disseminated rules and regulations." 298 The only case addressing the relation between the Florida statute and the Supreme Court
authority is Kersey v. Shipley, 299 in which two police officers under investigation for sexual misconduct were dismissed for disobeying a direct order to undergo a polygraph examination. The Fourth Circuit, in
affirming the dismissal of the officers' civil rights action, failed to recognize that the polygraph order created a self-incrimination issue and simply held that their discharge was not aribtrary and capricious. 300
V.

CONCLUSION

Historically, law enforcement officers have not enjoyed the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination that is available to
all other citizens. Police departments across the county continue to demand that law enforcement officers surrender the privilege as a condition
of employment or face administrative sanctions, including dismissal.
The Supreme Court attempted to remedy this problem in 1967 by
providing full protection for law enforcement officers. 3 0 1 Since then, four
state legislatures have enacted a law enforcement officers' bill of rights,
extending various procedural safeguards. 302 Unfortunately, neither
courts nor legislatures have advanced significantly the rights of law enforcement officers in general or their fifth amendment protection in
particular.
The protections of the United States Constitution apply to all citizens equally. In choosing their career, law enforcement officers should
not be required to abandon rights enjoyed by the public at large. One
solution to the problem is stronger state, or even federal, legislation. The
appendix to this article provides a Model Law Enforcement Officers' Bill

297.

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

only following the punitive personnel action because there is no right to a pre-termination hearing. Kersey v. Shipley, 673 F.2d 730, 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 836 (1982). Moreover, the hearing panel's recommendation, even iffavorable,
is only advisory to the police chief. VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.1-116.7.
Ironically, the Firefighter's and Emergency Medical Technician's Procedural Guarantees, Act of Mar. 26, 1987, ch. 509, 1987 Va. Laws 740 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN.§§ 2.1-116.9:1. to .9:5. (1987)), is broader in scope and prohibits the threatening of punitive action as retaliation for exercising constitutional or statutory protections. Id. §§ 2.1-116.9:2.8.,:4.
Id. § 2.1-116.6.
673 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982).
Id. at 733.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
See supra parts IV.B., C.
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of Rights. This comprehensive statute would secure for law enforcement
officers the full range of constitutional protections, including the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and would afford other related substantive and procedural rights as well. The legislative branch should move swiftly and decisively to redress the law
enforcement officer's unconstitutional predicament.
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§ 4-304. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing officer.
Subtitle 4. Declaratory hearing.
§ 4-401. Prior to declaratory hearing.
§ 4-402. During declaratory hearing.
§ 4-403. Disposition of declaratory hearing.
Subtitle 5. Temporary extraordinary procedures.
§ 4-501. Temporary extraordinary procedures.
Title 5. Remedies.
§ 5-101. Grievance.
§ 5-102. Injunction.
§ 5-103. Declaratory relief.
§ 5-104. Appeal from disciplinary or declaratory hearing.
§ 5-105. Civil suit.
§ 5-106. Legal defense.
§ 5-107. Attorney's fees.
Title 1. Preamble.

§ 1-101. Policy statement.
Law enforcement officers have a vital mission in society. The Law
Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights is enacted because:
(a) historically law enforcement officers have not been afforded the
full complement of constitutional and other protections provided generally to members of society; and
(b) the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with being a
law enforcement officer, combined with the legitimate needs of a law enforcement agency to maintain an efficient and effective organization, require that law enforcement officers be afforded certain substantive,
procedural, and remedial protections not afforded to members of society
generally.

§ 1-102. Statutory construction.
, Any ambiguities within the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of
Rights shall be resolved by providing a liberal interpretation to effectuate
the policy statement in § 1-101. Any conflict between this bill of rights
and any other state legislation shall be resolved to give effect to this act,
which supersedes all state law to the contrary. Similarly, this bill of
rights preempts all local law. The Administrative Procedures Act is applicable to the extent that it does not conflict with this bill of rights.
However, none of the remedies in title 5 require an exhaustion of administrative remedies.

§ 1-103. Administrative regulations.
A law enforcement agency may promulgate administrative rules,
regulations, and procedures necessary to implement this bill of rights.
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Title 2. Definitions.

§ 2-101. Agency.
Agency means a law enforcement agency.

§ 2-102. Circuit court.
In an action related to an administrative hearing, circuit court
means the circuit court of the county where the administrative hearing
was conducted or is scheduled to be conducted. Otherwise, circuit court
means the circuit court of the county where a law enforcement officer
regularly serves.

§ 2-103. Declaratory advocate.
A declaratory advocate is an individual selected by a law enforcement agency to represent the interest of the agency in a declaratory hearing. A declaratory advocate may be an attorney or non-attorney and
may be a member of the agency or from outside the agency.

§ 2-104. Declaratory hearing.
A declaratory hearing is an administrative hearing, initiated by a
law enforcement officer, against a law enforcement agency, seeking a declaration that a proposed personnel action is punitive and thus invalid
without a finding of guilt pursuant to a disciplinary hearing. ·

§ 2-105. Disciplinary advocate.
A disciplinary advocate is an individual selected by a law enforcement agency to represent the interest of the agency in a disciplinary hearing. A disciplinary advocate may be an attorney or non-attorney and
may be a member of the agency or from outside the agency.

§ 2-106. Disciplinary hearing.
A disciplinary hearing is an administrative hearing, initiated by a
law enforcement agency, against a law enforcement officer, based on
probable cause to believe that the officer has violated or is violating a
rule, regulation, or procedure related to service as an officer and is subject to punitive personnel action. Such hearing results in a finding of
guilty or not guilty as to each administrative charge and, if guilty, a recommendation as to punishment.

§ 2-107. Hearing board.
A hearing board is a three-member body selected (a) to make a finding of fact on the issue of guilt in a disciplinary hearing, and (b) to recommend the appropriate punishment in the event of a finding of guilt.
Subject to the exceptions in § 4-301(i) for small law enforcement agen-
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cies, a hearing board shall be composed of three members of the agency,
selected from a nine-member hearing board panel, drawn in a neutral
(preferably computerized) manner from a hearing board pool composed
of all members of the agency, excluding the police chief and the second
highest ranking officer.

§ 2-108. Hearing officer.
A hearing officer is the judge of law presiding over disciplinary and
declaratory hearings within a given law enforcement agency. A hearing
officer may not be a member of the agency and shall be selected, either on
a permanent, case-by-case, or other basis, by the civilian agency under
which the law enforcement agency serves.

§ 2-109. Interrogation.
A law enforcement officer is subjected to interrogation whenever the
officer is subjected to any of the following:
(a) questioning under circumstances that may lead to punitive personnel action;
(b) conduct or words designed to elicit a response or should be
known to be reasonably likely to elicit a response, regardless of whether a
response is forthcoming, under circumstances that may lead to punitive
personnel action;
(c) a polygraph examination;
(d) chemical testing;
(e) preparing, completing, or submitting a report, document, or
questionnaire, whether routine or otherwise, if prepared, completed, or
submitted, as a result of conduct for which the officer is under investigation or comes under investigation as a result of the content of such report, document, or questionnaire.
§ 2-110. Investigation.
A law enforcement officer is under investigation whenever the law
enforcement agency for which the officer serves, acting alone or in cooperation with another agency, or a division or unit within the agency, or
an individual officer of the agency who is superior in rank to, and in the
direct chain of command of, the officer, takes any action with regard to
the officer, including, but not limited to, asking questions of other officers
or civilians, conducting observations, evaluating reports, records, or
other documents, and examining physical evidence, if such action is
based on reasonable suspicion that the officer will in the future, is at that
time, or has in the past violated a criminal or civil statute or regulation or
violated a rule, regulation, or procedure related to service as an officer.
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§ 2-111. Law enforcement agency.
A law enforcement agency is any state, county, city, or other governmental agency that has as its primary responsibility the prevention
and detection of criminal activity or the enforcement of criminal, traffic,
or related laws, including but not limited to, all police departments and
sheriff departments.
§ 2-112. Law enforcement officer.
A law enforcement officer is a member of a law enforcement agency,
either full-time or part-time, cadet or officer, probationary or non-probationary, commissioned or non-commissioned, career or non-career, tenured or non-tenured, merit or non-merit, paid or unpaid, who is serving
in a position for which the primary responsibilities are the prevention
and detection of criminal activity or the enforcement of criminal, traffic,
or related laws. A law enforcement officer position is usually indicated
by formal training (regardless of whether the officer has yet completed or
even been assigned to such training) and usually is accompanied by the
power of arrest.
§ 2-113. Notice.
Notice means written notice mailed or hand-delivered. Notice shall
be provided directly to a law enforcement officer who is either not represented or who has a non-attorney representative. If the officer is represented by an attorney, notice shall be provided to the attorney. Notice to
a law enforcement agency shall be provided to the declaratory advocate
or disciplinary advocate. If such advocate has not yet been appointed,
notice shall be provided to the police chief or his or her named designee
for such purpose.
§ 2-114. Officer.
Officer means a law enforcement officer.
§ 2-115. Police chief.
Police chief is the chief of police, the acting chief of police, or the
highest ranking officer of a law enforcement agency, regardless of the
designation of such position.
§ 2-116. Prosecutor.
A prosecutor is an elected local or state prosecutor, state's attorney,
or district attorney, or a designee thereof, or a United States attorney or
an assistant United States attorney.
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§ 2-117. Punitive personnel action.
Punitive personnel action is punishment imposed as a result of a
finding of guilt in a disciplinary hearing.
(a) Per se punitive. The following personnel actions are per se punitive and thus may not be taken unless there has been a finding of guilt in
a disciplinary hearing:
(1) dismissal from a law enforcement agency; such action, however, is non-punitive if the law enforcement officer is a recruit in training
and the dismissal is based solely on the failure to meet minimum academic and performance standards;
(2) suspension from a law enforcement agency;
(3) demotion in rank;
(4) loss of base pay, leave pay, or leave time; and
(5) placement of adverse material in a law enforcement officer's
record, including any temporary or permanent file relating to personnel,
performance, promotion, or retirement matters.
(b) Case-by-case determination ofpunitive. The following personnel
actions may be punitive, depending upon whether instituted for the purpose of punishment or as sound, discretionary management decisions
based on the legitimate needs of a law enforcement agency to maintain an
efficient and effective organization:
(1) loss of sick leave, shift pay, bonus pay, or overtime pay;
(2) involuntary transfer or reassignment; such action, however,
is non-punitive as applied to a law enforcement officer with less than two
years service.
(c) Per se non-punitive. Involuntary transfer or reassignment, dismissal, or early retirement is non-punitive if based on the certification of
two physicians that, because of a medical condition, the law enforcement
officer lacks the ability to perform at a minimally acceptable level and
that no less drastic personnel action can accommodate both the needs of
the officer and the law enforcement agency.
Title 3. Rights.
I

§ 3-101. Generally.
A law enforcement officer shall enjoy all of the rights, privileges, and
protections afforded to members of society generally, regardless of
whether the source is constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or otherwise.
In no manner shall an officer be deemed to have fewer rights, privileges,
or protections solely by virtue of his or her status as an officer. This
includes the right to exercise any privilege or protection without fear of
threat, harassment, retaliation, or punitive personnel action. Even
though this section shall be deemed to encompass all rights, privileges,
and protections, §§ 3-102 through 3-106 address rights, privileges, and
protections of particular concern to officers.
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§ 3-102. Bill of rights.
Each law enforcement officer shall receive a copy of this bill of
rights, as well as all subsequent amendments by the legislature. Each
officer shall receive a copy of all administrative regulations promulgated
pursuant to this bill of rights. Such regulations shall contain at a minimum all conduct subject to punitive personnel action, including the maximum punishment for each violation. An officer may waive any right
provided by this bill of rights, provided such waiver is in writing and
contains the following language:
WAIVER OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS'
BILL OF RIGHTS
The Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights is designed
to provide the law enforcement officer with certain substantive,
procedural, and remedial protections not afforded to members
of society generally. You are strongly urged not to waive any
protection afforded by this bill of rights unless an attorney or
other knowledgeable individual representing your interest believes that a waiver of a given right is in your best interest. It is
a violation of your rights for any individual to obtain or attempt to obtain a waiver from you by trickery, harassment, or
threat.
I,
, have read and considered the above paragraph concerning waiver of my rights under the law enforcement officers' bill of rights. I have indicated my decision
, 19__ , as
concerning waiver, this
day of
follows:
(a) I refuse to waive any of my rights under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights.
Signature
(b) I do not waive all of my rights under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. However, I do waive the following
rights, either designated by section or explained as follows: _

Signature
(c) I waive all of my rights under the Law Enforcement
Officers' Bill of Rights.
Signature
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§ 3-103. Collective bargaining agreement.
A law enforcement officer is entitled to all substantive and procedural benefits contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Such negotiated rights may be used by an officer in lieu of, or in addition to, this bill
of rights.

§ 3-104. Political activity and other first amendment interests.
A law enforcement officer, when off-duty and when not acting in an
official capacity, shall enjoy the same right to engage in political activity
and the same freedoms of speech, expression, and association afforded to
members of society generally, subject to reasonable regulation by a law
enforcement agency with regard to associaton with known felons.

§ 3-105. Right of non-disclosure.
A law enforcement officer shall not be required to disclose any personal, family, or financial information relating to himself or herself or
any member of his or her family or household, subject to reasonable regulation by a law enforcement agency with regard to the mental and physical capabilities necessary to perform as an officer.

§ 3-106. Fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments.
A law enforcement officer shall enjoy the full complement of all constitutional protections afforded to members of society generally by the
fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution, as
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

§ 3-107. Due process of law.
A law enforcement officer shall be afforded due process of law. In
determining due process rights, an officer's position of employment shall
be deemed a property interest, protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, at such time as the officer has successfully completed all training and probationary periods, but in no event later than
two years after the commencement of service as an officer.

§ 3-108. Secondary employment.
A law enforcement officer is entitled to engage in secondary employment, subject to reasonable regulation by a law enforcement agency. An
officer who is licensed to practice law may not be prohibited from providing legal representation to another officer, even in matters with or against
the agency, solely because both the attorney and the client are members
of the same agency.
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Title 4. Procedures.
Subtitle 1. Investigation.
§ 4-101. Notice of investigation.
A law enforcement officer under investigation shall be notified of the
investigation within five days of the commencement of the investigation.
Notice shall include the general nature and scope of the investigation and
all criminal, civil, and departmental violations for which reasonable suspicion exists. No investigation based on a complaint from outside the
law enforcement agency may commence unless the complainant provides
a signed and notarized detailed statement. An investigation based on a
complaint from outside the agency shall commence within 15 days of
receipt of the complaint by the agency.
The notice requirement is continuing in nature in the event of a
change in the nature or scope of an investigation or the possible crimes or
violations arising therefrom. The notice requirement is waived if the
agency is investigating a matter it considers criminal, and not administrative, in which event the agency is precluded from instituting administrative charges against the officer unless and until criminal charges are filed
against the officer by the prosecutor.
Subtitle 2. Interrogation.
§ 4-201. Prior to interrogation.
(a) Notice of interrogation. A law enforcement agency shall notify a
law enforcement officer of its intent to subject the officer to interrogation
at least 72 hours prior to interrogation. The notice shall include the
name, rank, and command of the interrogating officer and one other person, if applicable, to be present during interrogation.
(b) Notice of right to a representative. A law enforcement agency
shall notify the law enforcement officer at least 72 hours prior to the
interrogation of the right to have a representative present during the entire interrogation and available at all times for consultation. The representative may be an attorney or non-attorney. The notice shall include
the fact that the officer is entitled to 10 days to retain an attorney or five
days to secure a non-attorney representative and is entitled to a postponement of interrogation, if necessary, to satisfy the time requirements.
(c) Notice of administrative-criminal election. A law enforcement
agency shall notify the law enforcement officer of its administrative-criminal election at least 72 hours prior to interrogation. The three election
options are as follows:
(1) Notice of a grant of informal transactional immunity provided by the law enforcement agency. A grant of informal transactional
immunity provided by the law enforcement agency means that the
agency is precluded from seeking any criminal charge for any crime arising from the named transaction. A copy of the grant of immunity shall
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accompany the agency's notice of election. The notice shall include the
legal consequences, which are (a) that the law enforcement officer must
answer all questions specifically, narrowly, and directly related to his or
her service as an officer; (b) that the answering of such questions bars the
agency from seeking criminal charges for any crime arising from the
named transaction; (c) that the failure to answer the questions permits
the agency to seek criminal charges for any crime arising from the named
transaction; and (d) that the content of the answers to such questions or
the failure to provide answers, as the case may be, may result in a disciplinary hearing and punitive personnel action.
(2) Notice of a grant offormal immunity provided by the prosecutor. A formal grant of immunity provided by the prosecutor means
that the prosecutor has formally conferred upon the law enforcement officer either (a) transactional immunity, meaning that the prosecutor is
precluded from charging the law enforcement officer with any crime arising from the named transaction, or (b) use and derivative use immunity,
meaning that no testimonal evidence, compelled· pursuant to the grant of
immunity, nor any fruits thereof, may be used against the officer in any
criminal proceeding. A copy of the grant of immunity shall accompany
the agency's notice of election. The notice shall include the legal consequences, which are (a) that the officer must answer all questions within
the scope of the grant of immunity; (b) that the answering of such questions bars all prosecutors from using the testimonial evidence provided
pursuant to the grant of immunity, and any other evidence derived therefrom, in any criminal proceeding against the defendant (in the event of a
grant of transactional immunity, it bars the jurisdiction granting it from
seeking criminal charges for any crime arising from the named transaction); (c) that the failure to answer such questions may result in criminal
contempt proceedings and possible incarceration; and (d) that the content of the answers to such questions or the failure to provide answers, as
the case may be, may result in a disciplinary hearing and punitive personnel action.
(3) Notice of the election to provide no immunity. The failure to
provide immunity means that the law enforcement agency has preserved
all options to proceed in an administrative proceeding, in a criminal proceeding, or both. This notice shall include the legal consequences, which
are (a) that the matter under investigation may be pursued in an administrative proceeding, in a criminal proceeding, or both; (b) that the officer
has the right to have an attorney present during questioning and that if
the officer cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for the officer;
(c) that the officer has an absolute right to remain silent and will not be
compelled to answer any questions; (d) that if the officer invokes the
right to remain silent, no punitive personnel action can be taken, or
threatened to be taken, against the officer and no adverse inference can be
drawn against the officer in either a criminal or administrative proceeding; and (e) if the officer chooses to answer any question, such answer
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may be used against the officer in a criminal proceeding, an administrative proceeding, or both.
(4) Modification of election. If a law enforcement agency elects
either informal or formal immunity, it may not subsequently rescind that
election. However, the agency, having elected either informal or formal
immunity, may add a second immunity election, either unilaterally or
after negotiation with the officer. If an agency makes no immunity election, subsequently it may replace its no immunity election with an election of informal immunity, formal immunity, or both.

§ 4-202. During interrogation.
(a) Right to a representative. The law enforcement officer has the
right to retained counsel, appointed counsel, or a non-attorney representative, as applicable under § 4-201(b), (c)(3).
(b) Conditions of interrogation. Interrogation shall:
(1) be conducted at a reasonable time, preferably while the law
enforcement officer is on duty;
(2) be conducted at a reasonable location, preferably at the office of the command of the investigating officer, at the office of the command of the law enforcement officer being interrogated, or at the office of
the command nearest to where the conduct under investigation allegedly
occurred;
(3) continue only for a reasonable period of time, permitting
reasonable breaks for personal hygiene, meals, and rest;
(4) be conducted by one interrogator, with no more than one
other person present (excluding a court reporter, if used) for the purpose
of consultation with the interrogator; and
(5) be recorded by audio tape, video tape, or transcription and,
upon request by the law enforcement officer, shall be provided, within 10
days after the interrogation.
Subtitle 3. Disciplinary hearing.

§ 4-301. Prior to disciplinary hearing.
(a) Notice of disciplinary charges. No disciplinary charges may be
brought against a law enforcement officer unless filed within 90 days of
the commencement of an investigation, except for good cause shown, in
which case charges shall be filed within 120 days of the commencement
of an investigation. The law enforcement agency shall notify the law enforcement officer of all disciplinary charges pending against the officer
not later than five days after the decision to charge. Notice shall include
(1) the right to be represented by an attorney or non-attorney representative at all stages of the administrative proceedings; (2) the administi:"ativecriminal election (in the event that the officer was not previously interrogated and therefore not previously notified of the agency's election under
§ 4-201(c)); and (3) the right to have the issue of guilt decided either by a
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hearing board or by a hearing officer and that such election must be
made by the later of 30 days before the hearing or 10 days after notification of the hearing date.
(b) Notice of disciplinary hearing. The law enforcement agency
shall notify the law enforcement officer, not later than 30 days after the
notice of disciplinary charges, of the following:
( 1) the date, time, and location of the disciplinary hearing; such
hearing shall take place not sooner than 30 days and not later than 60
days subsequent to this notice;
(2) the name and mailing address of the hearing officer; and
(3) the name, rank, and command of the disciplinary advocate,
if a law enforcement officer, or the n'ame, position, and mailing address of
the disciplinary advocate, if hot a law enforcement officer.
Subsequent to this notice, the management of the administrative
proceedings shall be under the exclusive control of the hearing officer and
the agency's legal position shall be represented exclusively by the disciplinary advocate.
(c) Change of venue. If the law enforcement officer is subject to a
punishment of dismissal from the law enforcement agency, the officer is
automatically entitled to a change of venue. If the officer is not subject to
dismissal or the law enforcement agency has waived, in writing, the use
of dismissal as a possible punishment, the officer is entitled to a change of
venue only upon a showing of a strong likelihood that the actions of the
hearing board, the hearing officer, or the police chief, as to the issue of
either guilt or punishment, would not be based solely on the evidence or
would be based on improper motive or bias. Such motion for change of
venue shall be made by the later of 30 days prior to the hearing or 10
days after receipt of the notice of hearing date. Such motion shall be
ruled on by the hearing officer, unless the requested change of venue is
based on alleged improper motive or bias of the hearing officer, in which
case the motion for change of venue shall be ruled on by the police chief.
A change of venue, whether automatic or granted, shall be implemented by moving the disciplinary hearing to another law enforcement
agency, using such other agency's police chief, hearing officer, and hearing board. The law enforcement officer entitled to or granted a change of
venue may waive moving the disciplinary hearing, in which case the disciplinary hearing shall be conducted in the accused officer's agency, using
his or her hearing officer and police chief, but using a hearing board selected from another agency.
(d) Discovery. The law enforcement agency and the law enforcement officer shall be entitled to whatever discovery, e.g., interrogatories,
depositons, production of documents, would be available if the matter
were in a circuit court.
(e). Notice of witnesses. The disciplinary advocate shall notify the
law enforcement officer, not later than 15 days prior to the hearing, of
the names and addresses of all witnesses for the law enforcement agency.
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(f) Production of investigation file. The disciplinary advocate shall
provide to the law enforcement officer not later than 15 days prior to the
hearing, a copy of the investigation file, including all exculpatory and
inculpatory information, but excluding confidential sources.
(g) Examination of physical evidence. The disciplinary advocate
shall notify the law enforcement officer, not later than 15 days prior to
the hearing, of all physical, non-documentary evidence, and provide a
reasonable date, time, place, and manner for the officer to examine such
evidence not later than 10 days prior to the hearing.
(h) Negotiated plea. The law enforcement officer and the disciplinary advocate may, at any time prior to a finding of guilt, negotiate a
disposition of the charges, a maximum punishment, or both. Such negotiated disposition may include an admission of guilt, silence as to guilt, or
an assertion of not guilty by the accused officer.
(i) Election of disciplinary hearing finder of fact. The law enforcement officer shall notify the hearing officer of his or her election to have
the issue of guilt decided by a hearing board or by the hearing officer.
Such election shall be made by the later of 30 days prior to the hearing or
10 days after receipt of the notice of hearing date. Such election shall
include whether the officer demands at least one member of the hearing
board to be equal in rank to the accused officer. If no timely election is
made, a hearing board shall be deemed waived and the officer shall have
the issue of guilt decided by the hearing officer. If an election of a hearing board is made, the hearing officer shall provide to the law enforcement officer and the disciplinary advocate, not later than 20 days prior to
the hearing, a written list of the nine-member hearing board panel. Each
party may exercise three peremptory strikes by notifying the hearing officer of the names struck, not later than 10 days prior to the hearing. If
the accused officer demanded at least one member of the hearing board to
be equal in rank to the accused officer, the disciplinary advocate may not
exercise peremptory strikes to strike all members equal in rank to the
accused, if any, on the hearing board panel. No additional strikes of any
kind may be exercised. In the event that less than six members of the
hearing board panel are struck, the hearing officer shall appoint as the
hearing board the three highest ranking officers not struck from the hearing board panel list. If the accused officer demanded at least one member
of the hearing board to be equal in rank to the accused officer, but no
member of the hearing board panel is equal in rank to the accused officer,
the hearing officer shall draw, from the hearing board pool, the next officer equal in rank to the accused officer. This officer shall be named to
the hearing board in lieu of the lowest ranking officer then on the hearing
board.
A law enforcement agency composed of less than 100 law enforcement officers may use a seven-member hearing board panel, with two
peremptory strikes for each party. An agency composed of less than 50

530

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 16

officers may use a five-member hearing board panel, with one peremptory
strike for each party.

§ 4-302. During a disciplinary hearing.
(a) Compel testimony and documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall have the power to issue summonses to compel testimony of
witnesses and to compel the production of documentatory evidence. If
confronted with a failure to comply with a summons, the hearing officer
may petition the circuit court to issue an order, with failure to comply
being subject to contempt of court.
(b) Pre-hearing motions. Each party may file pre-hearing motions.
Such motions shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the hearing.
The hearing officer may rule on any motion in writing prior to the· hearing or may rule on the record at the start of the hearing.
(c) Access to hearing. All disciplinary hearings shall be open to the
public unless the accused law enforcement officer requests a closed hearing, in which case the hearing shall be open only to those invited by the
accused officer.
(d) Record of hearing. All aspects of the hearing, including prehearing motions, shall be recorded by audio tape, video tape, or
transcription:
(e) Sequestration of witnesses. Either party may move for sequestration of witnesses.
(f) Oath or affirmation. The hearing officer shall administer an
oath or affirmation to each witness, who shall testify subject to the applicable laws of perjury.
(g) Opening statement. Each party is entitled to make an opening
statement.
(h) Evidentiary rulings and legal adviser. The laws and rules of evidence for administrative hearings shall apply, and all rulings shall be
made by the hearing officer, either in response to a motion or objection or
sua sponte. The hearing officer may have present, or on call, an attorney
adviser, who may not be (1) a member of the law enforcement agency, (2)
on a legal staff that represents the law enforcement agency, or (3) selected by, or subject to the approval of, the law enforcement agency.

§ 4-303. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing board.
(a) Ruling on burden of production. At the conclusion of the hearing, outside the presence of the hearing board, the hearing officer shall
rule, and may permit argument on, whether the disciplinary advocate has
met his or her burden of production by establishing a prima facie case as
to each charge. The hearing officer shall enter a verdict of not guilty for
any charge for which a prima facie case was not established.
(b) Written instructions to the hearing board. Any charge for which
a prima facie case has been established shall be submitted to the hearing
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board for a finding of fact. Prior to such submission, each party is entitled to make one closing argument without rebuttal. The hearing officer
shall provide the following items, in writing, to the hearing board for its
deliberations:
(1) a verdict sheet listing each charge;
(2) a list containing each element that must be established to
constitute each charge;
(3) instructions that the hearing board should not consider punishment when determining the issue of guilt;
(4) instructions that a finding of guilt requires a majority vote of
the hearing board;
(5) instructions that no member of the hearing board may vote
for guilt as to any charge unless that member finds that the disciplinary
advocate has established by clear and convincing evidence each element
of the charge and that the conduct was committed by the accused law
enforcement officer, either as the actual perpetrator or as an accomplice.
(c) Findings by the hearing board. The hearing board shall submit
its finding of guilty or not guilty for each charge on the verdict sheet
provided, which shall be made a part of the record.
(d) Recommendation of punishment by the hearing board. Each
charge for which the hearing board finds guilt shall be resubmitted to the
hearing board for a recommendation of punishment. Prior to such
resubmission, each party is entitled to present evidence relevant to the
accused officer's degree of culpability, his or her record as a law enforcement officer, and any other information relevant to the appropriate punishment. Each party is entitled to make one closing argument without
rebuttal. For its deliberations, the hearing board shall be provided with a
written list of all possible punishments for each charge for which guilt
was found. Additionally, the disciplinary advocate may submit his or
her recommended punishment for each charge. If guilt was found on
more than one charge, the disciplinary advocate may submit, in addition,
his or her recommended overall punishment, which may be different
than the sum of the individual punishments. The hearing board shall be
instructed to make a recommendation as to the appropriate punishment
for each guilty charge, as well as an appropriate overall punishment,
which may be different than the sum of the individual punishments.
(e) Recommendations and report of the hearing officer. The hearing
officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to each party, not later
than 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, to the police chief,
which shall contain the following:
(1) the hearing board's finding of guilty or not guilty for each
charge;
(2) the hearing board's recommendation as to the appropriate
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the
board's recommendation for the appropriate overall punishment;
(3) whether the hearing officer believes that each finding of guilt
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is correct or whether the finding of guilt goes against the weight of the
evidence; for each charge for which the hearing board entered a finding
of guilt, there shall be an appropriate discussion of the law and the facts;
and
·
(4) the hearing officer's recommendation as to the appropriate
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the
hearing officer's recommendation for the appropriate overall
punishment.
(f) Order and report of the police chief The police chief shall file a
written order, with a copy to each party, not later than 30 days after
receipt of the hearing officer's report. The police chief is bound by each
not guilty finding of the hearing board and by each guilty finding of the
hearing board in which the hearing officer concurred. As to any guilty
finding of the hearing board in which the hearing officer did not concur,
the police chief may make a finding of guilty or not guilty. The police
chief shall determine the punishment for each charge of guilty, as well as
the overall punishment. The punishment for any charge may be no more
severe than the greater of the two recommended punishments for that
charge. Similarly, the overall punishment may be no more severe than
the greater of the two recommended overall punishments.
§ 4-304. Disposition of disciplinary hearing by hearing officer.
(a) Findings by the hearing officer. At the conclusion of the hearing,
each party is entitled to make one closing argument without rebuttal.
The hearing officer shall make his or her finding of guilty or not guilty
for each charge, with a finding of guilt requiring clear and convincing
evidence.
(b) Recommendation of punishment by the hearing officer. As to
each charge for which the hearing officer found guilt, each party is entitled to present evidence relevant to the accused officer's degree of culpability, his or her record as a law enforcement officer, and any other
information relevant to the appropriate punishment. Each party is entitled to make one closing argument without rebuttal.
(c) Recommendations and report of the hearing officer. The hearing
officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to each party, not later
than 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, to the police chief,
which shall contain the following:
(1) the hearing officer's finding of guilty or not guilty for each
charge; for each finding of guilt, there shall be an appropriate discussion
of the law and the facts; and
(2) the hearing officer's recommendation as to the appropriate
punishment for each charge for which guilt was found, as well as the
hearing officer's recommendation for the appropriate overall punishment, if guilt was found on more than one charge.
(d) Order and report of the police chief The police chief shall file a
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written order, with a copy to each party, not later than 30 days after
receipt of the hearing officer's report. The police chief is bound by each
finding of guilty and not guilty. The police chief shall determine the punishment for each charge of guilt, as well as the overall punishment. The
punishment on any charge, as well as the overall punishment, may be no
more severe than that recommended by the hearing officer.
Subtitle 4. Declaratory hearings.
§ 4-401. Prior to declaratory hearing.
(a) All personnel actions under§ 2-117(a) are per se punitive, and
the law enforcement agency may not take such action unless there has
been a finding of guilt under§ 4-303 or§ 4-304; consequently, personnel
actions under § 2-117(a) cannot be the subject of a declaratory hearing.
(b) The law enforcement agency shall notify the law enforcement
officer of any personnel action under § 2-117(b), not later than five days
after the decision to take such personnel action. Notice shall include the
effective date of such action, which may be no sooner than 20 days subsequent to this notice. The officer shall also be notified that he or she has
the right to demand a declaratory hearing to determine whether such
action is punitive or non-punitive. Additionally, the officer shall be notified that he or she has a right to be represented by an attorney or nonattorney representative at all stages of the administrative proceedings.
(c) If the law enforcement officer requests a hearing within 15 days
of receipt of notice of the proposed personnel action, such personnel action shall be stayed pending the outcome of the hearing.
(d) The law enforcement agency shall notify the officer, not later
than 30 days after the notice of demand for hearing, of the following:
(1) the date, time, and location of the hearing; such hearing
shall take place not sooner than 15 days and not later than 45 days subsequent to this notice;
(2) the name and mailing address of the hearing officer; and
(3) the name, rank, and command of the declaratory advocate.
Subsequent to this notice, the management of the administrative
proceedings shall be under the exclusive control of the hearing officer and
the agency's legal position shall be represented exclusively by the declaratory advocate.
§ 4-402. During declaratory hearing.
A declaratory hearing shall be conducted in the manner required for
a disciplinary hearing under § 4-302.
§ 4-403. Disposition of declaratory hearing.
(a) At the conclusion of the hearing, each party is entitled to make
one closing argument without rebuttal. The hearing officer shall deter-
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mine whether the personnel action at issue is punitive or non-punitive,
with the burden of pursuasion on the declaratory advocate to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the action is non-punitive.
(b) The hearing officer shall submit a written report, with a copy to
each party, not later than 15 days after the conclusion of hearing, to the
police chief, explaining the reasons for the finding. The police chief is
bound by the hearing officer's finding. If the personnel action is found to
be non-punitive, it may take effect immediately. If the personnel action
is found to be punitive, it is null and void.
Subtitle 5. Temporary extraordinary procedures.
§ 4-501. Temporary extraordinary procedures.
The police chief may order suspension with pay or an involuntary
reassignment for a law enforcement officer for whom there is probable
cause to believe that the officer (a) has committed a felony, (b) has committed a crime of violence, (c) has committed a crime of moral turpitude,
(d) poses immediate threat to the safety of self or others, or (e) poses
immediate threat to the property of others. The officer shall be provided,
not later than 48 hours after such suspension or reassignment, a written
order setting forth which one or more of the five reasons above support
such action in the officer's case.
(a) Criminal charges. If, within 15 days after the written order, the
law enforcement officer is formally charged, by grand jury indictment or
criminal information, with a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral
turpitude, the police chief may continue suspension with pay or involuntary reassignment or may order suspension without pay. If the officer is
subsequently found guilty of, and sentenced for, a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral turpitude, the officer is subject to any punitive
personnel action without a hearing. If the officer is subsequently found
not guilty of all charges of a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral
turpitude, the officer shall be returned to duty in the status that existed
prior to the extraordinary procedure, including back pay and benefits for
any time suspended without pay. However, the law enforcement agency
may institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the officer while
criminal charges are pending or after a finding of not guilty, even though
the administrative charges arise out of the same conduct involved in the
criminal charges.
(b) Civil commitment. If, within 15 days after the written order, the
law enforcement officer is civilly committed as posing immediate threat
to the safety of self or others or posing immediate threat to the property
of others, the police chief may continue suspension with pay or involuntary reassignment or may order suspension without pay or placement on
sick leave, as appropriate. If the officer is subsequently released from
civil commitment, the officer shall be returned to duty in the status that
existed prior to the extraordinary procedure, including back pay and
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benefits for any time suspended without pay. However, the law enforcement agency may institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the
officer once returned to duty, even though the administrative charges
arise out of the same conduct for which the officer was civilly committed.
(c) Neither criminal charges nor civil commitment. If, within 15
days after the written order, the law enforcement officer is neither formally charged with a felony, crime of violence, or crime of moral turpitude, nor civilly committed as posing immediate threat to the safety of
self or others or posing immediate threat to the property of others, the
officer shall be returned to duty in the status that existed prior to the
extraordinary procedure. However, the law enforcement agency may institute regular disciplinary proceedings against the officer, even though
the administrative charges arise out of the same conduct for which extraordinary procedures were used.
Title 5. Remedies

§ 5-101. Grievance.
A state agency outside the law enforcement agency shall establish a
law enforcement officer grievance procedure, which may utilize grievance
procedures already in effect for other public employees. A law enforcement officer may file a grievance against any other law enforcement officer for past, present, or threatened denial of any right provided by
constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, provided such denial is related to the aggrieved officer's service as an officer. An officer may use
the grievance procedure in addition to, or in lieu of, any other remedy in
this title. However, no other remedy is foreclosed because of the failure
to pursue a remedy through the grievance procedure.

§ 5-102. Injunction.
(a) To the hearing officer. A law enforcement officer, charged under
§ 4-301, who is being denied, by a law enforcement agency, any right
provided by constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, may petition
the hearing officer for an injunction, prohibiting the law enforcement
agency from violating the law. Such petition for injunctive relief must be
filed not later than 10 days prior to the hearing or 48 hours subsequent to
the alleged denial of the right, whichever comes later. The filing of a
petition stays the hearing until the hearing officer rules upon the petition.
(b) To the circuit court. A law enforcement officer, charged under
§ 4-301, whose petition for injunctive relief under § 5-102(a) is denied, or
who is otherwise still being denied any right afforded by constitution,
statute, regulation, or otherwise, may petition the circuit court for an
injunction, prohibiting the law enforcement agency from violating the
law. Such petition shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the hearing or 48 hours subsequent to the notice of denial of injunctive relief by
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the hearing officer, whichever comes later. The filing of a petition stays
the hearing until the circuit court rules upon the petition.
(c) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit
court under§ 5-102(b) is immediately appealable to the intermediate appellate court by either the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed not later than 10 days prior to the
hearing or 48 hours subsequent to the notice of the denial or grant of
injunctive relief by the circuit court, whichever comes later. The filing of
a notice of appeal stays the hearing until the intermediate appellate court
rules upon the petition.

§ 5-103. Declaratory relief.
(a) To the circuit court. A law enforcement officer, not charged
under § 4-301 and not eligible for a declaratory hearing under § 4-401,
who is being denied, by the law enforcement agency, any right provided
by constitution, statute, regulation, or otherwise, may file an action for
declaratory relief in the circuit court, provided the officer submitted to
the police chief a notice of demand of such right and such right was not
afforded within 15 days.
(b) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit
court under § 5-103(a) may be appealed to the intermediate appellate
court by either the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later
than 30 days subsequent to the order of the circuit court.

§ 5-104. Appeal from disciplinary or declaratory hearing.
(a) To the circuit court from a disciplinary hearing. A law enforcement officer may appeal from a decision of guilt rendered under § 4-303
or§ 4-304. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later
than 30 days after the order and report of the police chief. Such appeals
shall be argued on the record from the administrative agency, unless the
punishment is dismissal. If the punishment is dismissal, the appeal shall
be in the form of a trial de novo. A law enforcement agency may not
appeal a decision rendered under § 4-303 or § 4-304.
(b) To the circuit court from a declaratory hearing. Either a law
enforcement officer or a law enforcement agency may appeal a decision
rendered under § 4-403. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit
court not later than 30 days after the report of the hearing officer.
(c) To the intermediate appellate court. A ruling by the circuit
court under§ 5-104(a) or§ 5-104(b) may be appealed to the intermediate
appellate court by the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement
agency. Notice of appeal shall be filed with the circuit court not later
than 30 days after the order of the circuit court.
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§ 5-105. Civil suit.
A law enforcement officer who has been harmed by any individual
may file suit against such individual seeking money damages. No law
may limit a cause of action solely because the plaintiff is a law enforcement officer.
§ 5-106. Legal defense.

A law enforcement officer, against whom a civil suit is filed, shall be
entitled to legal representation from the law enforcement agency, provided that the cause of action arose in the scope of the officer's service as
a law enforcement officer. If legal representation is denied, the officer
may seek declaratory relief under § 5-103.
§ 5-107. Attorney's fees.
(a) Right to attorney's fees. A law enforcement officer shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees if he or she prevails in any of the following actions, and may be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees if lie or she
prevails in part:
(1) a disciplinary hearing under § 4-303 or § 4-304;
(2) a declaratory hearing under § 4-403;
(3) a grievance under § 5-101;
(4) an injunction under § 5-102;
(5) declaratory relief under § 5-103;
(6) an appeal under§ 5-104; and
(7) a petition for attorney's fees under § 5-107(b).
(b) Petition to the circuit court. A law enforcement officer entitled
to attorney's fees under § 5-107(a) may petition the circuit court for an
order establishing the right to, and the amount of, attorney's fees.

